The Municipal Court in Prague referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Does a person who is, pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID II), excluded from the scope of that Directive, and who does not, pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Directive, enjoy the freedom to provide services as defined in Article 34 thereof, enjoy the right to freedom to provide services embodied in Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if it itself does not provide investment services on the basis of a single European passport to a client established in another Member State, but rather receives an investment service from a foreign entity using a single European passport or otherwise takes part in its provision to the end client (acts as an intermediary)?

2/ If the answer to the previous question is affirmative, does EU law, namely Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, preclude legislation prohibiting an investment broker from transmitting a client’s order to a foreign securities trader?

Referral decision of the Municipal Court in Prague n. 18 A 45/2021-96, 26 October 2022.

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Must the last sentence of Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a national court must, in proceedings initiated on the application of a third party (competitor), order the recipient to return aid provided in breach of that provision even though (as at the date of the court’s decision) the limitation period for the Commission’s powers pursuant to Article 17(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 ¹ of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has expired, due to which the aid provided is deemed, pursuant to Article 1(b)(iv) and Article 17(3) of the Regulation, to constitute existing aid?

Referral decision of the Supreme Court n. 23 Cdo 1180/2021-577, 26 September 2022.

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The District Court in Prague-west referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Is the purpose of Directive 2008/48/EC ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC to penalise credit providers for a failure to fully examine a consumer’s creditworthiness, even in cases when the consumer fully paid up the credit and raised no objections against the agreement while paying?

Referral decision of the District Court in Prague-west n. 36C 41/2022-95, 1 August 2022. 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The High Court in Prague referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Does the spirit and purpose of Directive 2000/31/EC preclude Article 14(1) thereof from being interpreted as meaning that the liability of a provider of an information gathering (hosting) service for the contents of such service includes liability for the manner in which such service is provided?

Does the spirit and purpose of Directive 2000/31/EC allow for Article 14(1) thereof to be interpreted as meaning that the rules for limiting the liability of a provider of an information gathering (hosting) service set out therein cannot exclude the private-law liability of such a provider for the choice of a particular business model for the provision of the service, even if that model has the potential to benefit from copyright infringement?

Does the liability waiver set out in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC apply to the provider of an information gathering service, and selection from it by means of a search engine, in terms of liability for the manner of its provision, if that manner encourages the service recipient to store the information on it without the consent of the copyright holders, but without the active participation of the service provider in the copyright infringement?

Referral decision of the High Court in Prague n. 3 Cmo 28/2019- 1449, 22 June 2022.

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Regional Court in Brno referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Should the criterion for the designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Article 37(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection in Annex I(b) to [that directive] – i.e., that the country concerned provides protection against persecution and ill treatment through observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of that convention – be interpreted as meaning that, if the country withdraws from its commitments under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in time of emergency under Article 15 of the Convention, it no longer meets the criterion for being designated as a safe country of origin?

2/ Should Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council be interpreted as meaning that they prevent a Member State from designating a country as a safe country of origin only in part, with certain territorial exceptions, to which the assumption that that part of the country is safe for the applicant will not apply, and if the Member State does designate a country with such territorial exceptions as safe, then the country concerned as a whole cannot be deemed a safe country of origin for the purposes of [that directive]?

3/ If the reply to either of these two questions referred is affirmative, should Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a court deciding about an appeal challenging the decision on the manifestly unfounded nature of the application, pursuant to Article 32(2) of [that directive], issued in proceedings conducted pursuant to Article 31(8)(b) of [that directive], must take into account ex officio that the designation of the country as safe is contrary to EU law, due to the reasons stated above, without requiring an objection on the part of the applicant?

Referral decision of the Regional Court in Brno n. 41 Az 14/2022-30, 20 June 2022. 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

From the perspective of the existence of an international element, which is required for Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to apply, is the application of that regulation to be based solely on the fact that two parties with their seat in the same Member State agree on the jurisdiction of courts of another EU Member State?

Referral decision of the Supreme Court n. 30 Nd 674/2021-60, 14 June 2022.

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Must Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that the concept ‘contract for the provision of services’ also includes a contract to enter into a future contract (pactum de contrahendo), in which the parties undertook to enter into a future contract that would be a contract for the provision of services, within the meaning of that provision?

Referral decision of the Supreme Court n. 30 Cdo 1985/2021-69, 5 May 2022. 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Regional Court in Brno referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Is it compatible with Articles 2(3) and 2a(2) of Directive 89/665/EEC, interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, for Czech legislation to permit a contracting authority to conclude a public contract before an action is brought before a court competent to review the legality of a second-instance decision of the Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Office for the Protection of Competition) to exclude a tenderer?

Referral decision of the Regional Court in Brno n. 41 A 35/2021-27, 28 February 2022. 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Regional Court in Brno referred this question to the Court of Justice:

Must Article 4(2) and (3) and Article 5 in fine of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4 and 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, be interpreted as precluding the assessment of whether a return decision under Article 4(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union should be interpreted as a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on the return of illegally staying third-country nationals? 6 of Directive 2008/115/EC does not lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, to apply the concept of safe country of origin under Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status in combination with the narrowed definition of the principle of non-refoulement focusing only on the prohibition of ill-treatment under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The High Court in Prague referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ On the basis of what criteria does the entitlement to obtain the fixed sum of at least EUR 40 arise pursuant to Article 6(1) of [Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combatting late payment in commercial transactions] in the case of agreements with recurring or ongoing performance?

2/ Can the claim pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Directive be refused by Member State courts on the grounds of the application of general private-law principles?

3/ If the response to the second question is in the affirmative, subject to what conditions can Member State courts refuse to award the amount of the claim under Article 6(1) of the Directive?

Referral decision of the High Court in Prague of 24 January 2022. 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-78/22, 4 May 2023, ruled that:

1/ Article 6(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, read in conjunction with Article 3 of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a single contract provides for periodic payments, each of which must be made within a specified period, the fixed minimum sum of EUR 40 provided for in Article 6(1) is payable, by way of compensation for the creditor’s recovery costs, in respect of each late payment.

2/ Article 6(1) of Directive 2011/7, read in conjunction with Article 6(3), and point (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive, must be interpreted as precluding a national court from refusing or reducing the fixed sum provided for in the first provision, on the basis of the general principles of national private law, including where late payments which have arisen in the context of a single contract relate, inter alia, to amounts that are low or lower than that fixed sum.

The follow-up judgement of the High Court in Prague is not available yet. 

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time be interpreted as precluding national case-law by virtue of which a worker who was unlawfully dismissed then reinstated in his or her employment, in accordance with national law, following the annulment of the dismissal by a decision of a court, is not entitled to paid annual leave for the period between the date of the dismissal and that of the reinstatement in his or her employment on the ground that, during that period, that worker did not actually carry out work for the employer, also in cases when, according to national legislation, the worker who has been unlawfully dismissed and who has without undue delay informed his or her employer in writing that he or she insists on being employed, is entitled to wage or salary compensation in the amount of average earnings from the date when he or she informed the employer that he or she insists on the continuation of his or her employment until such time as the employer allows him or her to carry on in his or her work or his or her employment relationship is validly terminated?

Referral decision of the Supreme Court of 6 December 2021.

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Municipal Court in Prague referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Must Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/104 and general principles of EU law be interpreted such that Directive 2014/104, in particular Article 10 thereof, will apply, directly or indirectly, to the present dispute seeking compensation in respect of all harm caused by a breach of Article 102 TFEU, which commenced before the date on which Directive 2014/104 entered into force and ended after the expiry of the transposition period for its implementation, in a situation when the action seeking compensation in respect of harm was also lodged after the expiry of the transposition period, or such that Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 will apply only to the part of the conduct (and the ensuing part of harm) occurring after the date on which Directive 2014/104 entered into force or, as the case may be, after the expiry of the deadline for its transposition?

2/ Do the meaning and purpose of Directive 2014/104 and/or Article 102 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness require Article 22(2) of Directive 2014/104 to be interpreted such that the ‘national measures adopted pursuant to Article 21, other than those referred to in [Article 22,] paragraph 1’ are those provisions of national legislation through which Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 was implemented, in other words, do Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 and the rules on limitation fall within the first or the second paragraph of Article 22 of Directive 2014/104?

3/ Is national legislation and its interpretation in line with Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104 and/or with Article 102 TFEU and with the principle of effectiveness if it links ‘knowledge of the fact that harm was caused’ – relevant to the commencement of the subjective limitation period – to the awareness of the injured party ‘of individual partial [occurrences of] harm’, which occur over time in the course of continuous or continuing anticompetitive conduct (as case-law is based on the assumption that the claim in question for compensation in respect of harm is, in its entirety, divisible) and in relation to which separate subjective limitation periods start to run regardless of the knowledge of the injured party of the full extent of the harm caused by the entire infringement of Article 102 TFEU, that is, national legislation and its interpretation that allow the limitation period for a claim for compensation in respect of harm caused by anti-competitive conduct to begin to run before the point at which ceased that conduct consisting of more favourable placement and display of one’s own price comparison engine [OR. 2] in breach of Article 102 TFEU?

4/ Do Article 10(2), (3), and (4) of Directive 2014/104 and/or Article 102 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness preclude national legislation that provides that a subjective limitation period, in the case of actions seeking compensation in respect of harm, is three years and starts to run on the day when the injured party learned or could have learned of partial harm and of the person obliged to compensate for it, but does not take into account (i) the point at which the infringement ceased; (ii) the knowledge of the injured party that the conduct constitutes an infringement of the competition rules and that, at the same time (iii) does not suspend or interrupt the three-year limitation period during the proceedings before the Commission concerning the ongoing infringement of Article 102 TFEU; and (iv) does not contain the rule that the suspension of the limitation period will end no earlier than one year after the decision concerning the infringement has become final?

Referral judgement of the Municipal Court in Prague n. 1 Cm 22/2020-231, 29 September 2021. 

The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Must the expression “the commission lost by the commercial agent,” within the meaning of Article 17(2)(a), second indent, of [Directive 86/653], be interpreted to the effect that such commissions include commissions for the conclusion of contracts which a commercial agent would have entered into had the commercial agency [contract] endured, with the customers that he or she brought the principal or with which he or she significantly increased the volume of business?

2/ If so, subject to what conditions does this conclusion apply to ‘one-off commissions’ for the conclusion of a contract?

Referral decision of the Supreme Court n. 23 Cdo 2310/2020, 29 June 2021.

The Court of Justice in judgement C-574/21, 23 March 2023, ruled that:

1/ Article 17(2)(a) of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents is to be interpreted as meaning that the commission which the commercial agent would have received in the event of a hypothetical continuation of the agency contract, in respect of transactions which would have been concluded after the termination of that agency contract with new customers which he or she brought to the principal before that termination, or with customers with which he or she significantly increased the volume of business before that termination, must be taken into account in determining the indemnity provided for in Article 17(2) of that directive.

2/ Article 17(2)(a) of Directive 86/653 is to be interpreted as meaning that the payment of one-off commissions does not exclude from the calculation of the indemnity, provided for in Article 17(2), the commission lost by the commercial agent resulting from transactions carried out by the principal, after the termination of the commercial agency contract, with new customers which he or she brought to the principal before that termination, or with customers with which he or she significantly increased the volume of business before that termination, where those commissions correspond to flat-rate remuneration under any new contract concluded with those new customers or with existing customers of the principal, through the commercial agent.

The follow-up judgement of the Supreme Court is not available yet. 

The Area Court in Prague 1 referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Does the national legislation pursuant to Part Five of Act No 99/1963 Coll., the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code of Civil Procedure' or 'CCP') meet the requirements for judicial review of a decision of a regulatory body pursuant to Article 56(10) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area (hereinafter referred to as 'Directive 2012/34')?

2/ If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is it compatible with Article 56(6) of Directive 2012/34 for the decisions of the regulatory body to be superseded by the judgments of individual ordinary courts on the merits of the level of infrastructure charges in proceedings involving applicants and the infrastructure manager, to the exclusion of the regulatory body?

3/ If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, do the requirements for the establishment of a single national regulatory body for the rail sector under Article 55(1), for the functions of the regulatory body under Article 56(2), (11) and (12) and for cooperation between regulatory bodies under Article 57(2) of Directive 2012/34 allow for the possibility that the decisions of the regulatory body may be superseded on the merits by judgments of individual general courts which are not bound by the facts as established by the regulatory body?

Referral decision of the District Court in Prague 1 n. 41 C 116/2020-175, 1 October 2020.

The Court of Justice in the decision in joint cases C-221/21 and C-222/21, 2 May 2022 declared the preliminary reference as manifestly inadmissible.

The Municipal Court in Prague referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:

Does Article 10(8) of European Commission Decision 2011/278/EU ¹ of 27 April 2011, read in conjunction with Annex I thereto, require emission allowances to be allocated free of charge for the period 2013 to 2020 to an installation operating a basic oxygen furnace process, where the input to that process is carbon-saturated liquid iron imported from another installation belonging to another operator, if at the same time it is ensured that there will be no double counting or double allocation of allowances in respect of the hot metal product?

If the first question is answered in the negative, is Article 10(8) of European Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011, read in conjunction with Annex I thereto, invalid with respect to the hot metal product on the grounds that it is incompatible with Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Annex I thereto, or alternatively on the grounds that it is incomprehensible?

If the second question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 1(1) of European Commission Decision 2013/448/EU ² of 5 September 2013 also invalid in respect of the installation bearing the identifier CZ-existing-CZ-52-CZ-0102-05 given that it no longer has a legal basis?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 1(1) and the third subparagraph of Article 1(2) of European Commission Decision 2013/448/EU of 5 September 2013 be interpreted in respect of the installation bearing the identifier CZ-existing-CZ-52-CZ-0102-05 as permitting the allocation of allowances for the hot metal product to that installation on the basis of a new application from the Czech Republic if double counting and double allocation of allowances are excluded?

If the fourth question is answered in the negative, is Article 1(1) of European Commission Decision 2013/448/EU of 5 September 2013 invalid in respect of the installation bearing the identifier CZ-existing-CZ-52-CZ-0102-05 on the grounds that it is incompatible with Article 10(8) of European Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011, read in conjunction with Annex I thereto?

If the third, fourth or fifth question is answered in the affirmative, how should an authority of a Member State proceed under EU law where that authority has failed, contrary to EU law, to allocate free emission allowances to the operator of an installation which operates a basic oxygen furnace process if the installation concerned is no longer in operation and the period for which the allowances were allocated has already ended?

Referral decision of the Municipal Court in Prague n. 10 A 35/2019-63, 29 September 2020. 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-524/20, 21 December 2021, ruled that:

"The third subparagraph of Article 1(1) and (2) of Commission Decision 2013/448/EU of 5 September 2013 concerning national implementing measures for the transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Article 11(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as not allowing the disputed installation in the original proceedings to be allocated free allowances under the 'liquid metal' product benchmark on the basis of a new application by the Czech Republic, even if double counting of emissions and double allocation of allowances is excluded." 

The follow-up judgement of the Municipal Court in Prague n. 10 A 35/2019-145, 2 June 2022.

The Office for Access to Transport Infrastructure referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

1/ Are information carriers which contain passenger information in paper form and are located in railway station premises service facilities within the meaning of Article 3(11) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area?

2/ Is Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on the creation of a single European railway area binding on České dráhy, a. s., as a state in a broader sense, pursuant to Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union? Can individuals invoke the direct effect of a transposed or untransposed directive against České dráhy, a. s.?

The Court of Justice in decision C-104/21, 26 October 2022 declared the preliminary reference as manifestly inadmissible.

The Office for Access to Transport Infrastructure referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Does the place of loading and unloading for the transport of goods, including related tracks, constitute part of railway infrastructure as defined by Article 3(3) of Directive 2012/34? ¹

2/ Is it in accordance with Directive 2012/34 that an infrastructure manager may at any time change prices for the use of railway infrastructure or service facilities to the detriment of freight forwarders?

3/ Is Directive 2012/34 binding for Správa železnic, státní organizace (the Railway Administration) pursuant to Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

4/ Can the rules set out in a network statement be deemed discriminatory if they are not consistent with the EU legislation to which the Railway Administration is obliged to adhere?

Referral decision of the Office for Access to Transport Infrastructure n. UPDI-3466/20/KE, 23 September 2020.

The Court of Justice in judgement  C-453/20, ruled that:

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře (Transport infrastructure access authority, Czech Republic) is inadmissible.

The Area Court in Prague 1 referred the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice:

1/ Does the national legislation under Part Five of Act No 99/1963 Coll., the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended ("the Code of Civil Procedure" or "the Code of Civil Procedure") meet the requirements for judicial review of a regulatory body's decision under Article 56(10) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area ("Directive 2012/34")?

2/ If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, can Article 56(10) of Directive 2012/34 be interpreted as meaning that judicial review of a decision of a regulatory body may be concluded by judicial conciliation pursuant to Article 99 of the Civil Procedure Code?

3/ If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, do the requirements for the establishment of a single national regulatory body for the rail sector under Article 55(1) allow for the functions of the regulatory body under Article 56(2), (6), (11) and (12) and for cooperation between regulatory bodies under Article 57(2) of Directive 2012/34 to be replaced on the merits by judgments of individual ordinary courts which are not bound by the facts as found by the regulatory body?

The Court of Justice in the decision C-221/21, 2 May 2022 declared the preliminary reference as manifestly inadmissible.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice :

1/ Must Article 13 of Directive [2012/19] be interpreted as meaning that it prevents a Member State from imposing the obligation to finance the costs of the collection, treatment, recovery, and environmentally sound disposal of WEEE coming from photovoltaic panels placed on the market [by] 1 January 2013 on their users, rather than their producers?

2/ If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the evaluation of the conditions for the liability of a Member State for damage caused to an individual due to a breach of EU law influenced by the fact – which is the case in the main proceedings – that the Member State itself regulated the method of financing of waste from photovoltaic panels prior [even] to the adoption of [Directive 2012/19], which newly included photovoltaic panels in the scope of EU regulation and imposed the obligation to finance the costs on producers, including in relation to panels placed on the market prior to the expiry of the directive’s implementation period (and the adoption of regulation at European Union level)?’

Referral judgement of the Supreme Court n. 30 Cdo 880/2019-212,12 March 2020

The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) in judgement C-181/20, 25 January 2022, decided:

1/ Article 13(1) of Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is invalid in so far as it imposes on producers the obligation to finance the costs relating to the management of waste from photovoltaic panels placed on the market between 13 August 2005 and 13 August 2012.

Article 13(1) of Directive 2012/19 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which imposes on users of photovoltaic panels, and not on producers of those panels, the obligation to finance the costs relating to the management of waste from such panels placed on the market from 13 August 2012, the date on which that directive entered into force.

2/ EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a Member State adopted legislation contrary to an EU directive prior to the adoption of that directive does not constitute, in itself, a breach of EU law, since the achievement of the result prescribed by the directive cannot be regarded as seriously compromised before the directive forms part of the EU legal order.

The follow-up judgement of the Supreme Court n. 30 Cdo 880/2019-420, 8 March 2022.

The Regional Court in Brno referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Is national legislation contrary to the purpose of Article 90(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC ¹ of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax if it lays down a condition preventing value added taxpayers, where tax becomes chargeable on a taxable supply to another taxpayer who paid for the supply only in part or not at all, from making a correction to the amount of output tax in respect of the value of the claim if that claim arose less than six months before a court decision declaring the other taxpayer insolvent?

Referral decision of the Regional Court in Brno n. 62 Af 621/2018, 20 August 2020. 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-398/20, ruled that:

"Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value-added tax must be interpreted as precluding a national provision which makes adjustment of the amount of value-added tax subject to the condition that the partially or totally unpaid claim must not have arisen during the six-month period preceding the declaration of insolvency of the debtor company, where it is not ruled out under that condition that such a claim may ultimately be definitively irrecoverable."

The Area Court for Prague 8 asked the Court of Justice whether the concept of the consumer's domicile within the meaning of Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation No 1215/2012 means the consumer's domicile on the date the action was brought or on the date the contractual relationship between the consumer and his contractual partner was established (i.e., the date the contract was concluded). That is to say, whether a contract is a consumer contract within the meaning of that provision even if the consumer is already domiciled in a Member State other than the State in which the consumer's contractual partner carries on a professional or business activity on the date of the action. He also asked whether a consumer who is domiciled in another Member State may be sued under Article 7 of that regulation in the courts of the place where the obligation was performed or should have been performed on the ground that the consumer's contractual partner is not carrying on a professional or business activity in the State in which the consumer is domiciled on the date of the action.

By order of 2 September 2020, the Court of Justice replied that the term 'consumer's domicile' in Article 18(2) of the regulation must be interpreted as meaning the consumer's domicile on the date on which the action is brought.

The Regional Court in Brno referred questions to the Court of Justice:

1/ Does a V I 1 document issued under Commission Regulation (EC) No 555/2008 ¹ of 27 June 2008 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine as regards support programmes, trade with third countries, production potential and on controls in the wine sector, and containing a certificate issued by an authorised body from a third country certifying that the product has been produced in accordance with oenological practices recommended and published by the OIV or approved by the Community constitute a mere administrative condition for the entry of wine into the territory of the European Union?

2/ Does EU law preclude a national rule which allows a dealer of wine imported from Moldova to avoid liability for the administrative offence of marketing wine which has undergone oenological practices not allowed in the European Union, unless the national authorities refute the dealer's assumption that the wine was produced in accordance with oenological practices approved by the European Union, which the dealer made from the V I 1 document issued by the Moldovan authorities under Commission Regulation (EC) No 555/2008?

Referral decision of the Regional Court in Brno n. 31 A 103/2016-409, 14 January 2020. 

The Court of Justice in judgement n. C-86/20, ruled that:

1/ Article 80(2)(a) and (c) and Article 90(3)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 must be interpreted as meaning that the certificate appearing in a V I 1 document, drawn up for a consignment of wine imported into the European Union under Article 43 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 555/2008 of 27 June 2008 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine as regards support programmes, trade with third countries, production potential and on controls in the wine sector, according to which that consignment was produced in accordance with oenological practices recommended and published by the International Organisation of Vine and Wine or authorised by the European Union, is relevant in order to determine whether the consignment complies with the oenological practices referred to in Article 80(2)(a) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, but is not sufficient on its own to establish such compliance.

2/ Article 89(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, read in conjunction with Article 80(2) of Regulation No 1308/2013, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that provides that, where a person marketing, in that Member State, a consignment of wine imported from a third country that does not comply with the oenological practices referred to in Article 80(2)(a) or (c) of Regulation No 1308/2013 produces a V I 1 document drawn up for that consignment certifying that the consignment has undergone oenological practices recommended and published by the International Organisation of Vine and Wine or authorised by the European Union, the burden of proving the existence of fault on the part of the trader for the infringement of the marketing prohibition provided for in Article 80(2) of Regulation No 1308/2013 is on the competent authorities of that Member State.

The follow-up judgement of the Regional Court in Brno n. 31 A 103/2016-154, 21 November 2018. 

The Regional Court in Ostrava referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Should the product labelled ‘Bob Martin Clear 50 mg roztok pro nakapání na kůži — spot-on pro kočky’ made available in pipettes (0.5 ml), which contains the active substance fipronil (50 mg per pipette) and the excipients butylated hydroxyanisole E 320, butylated hydroxytoluene E 321, benzyl alcohol and diethylene glycol monoethyl ether, be classified under heading 3004 or heading 3808 of the Combined Nomenclature of the Customs Tariff?

Referral decision of the Regional Court n. 64 Af 9/2018-41, 13 December 2019. 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-941/19, ruled that:

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the version resulting from Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1101/2014 of 16 October 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that a product consisting of a solution intended for cats, which must be applied by local cutaneous route (spot-on) by means of pipettes (0.5ml) and which contains the active substance fipronil (50 mg per pipette), and excipients, such as butylated hydroxyanisole E 320, butylated hydroxytoluene E 321, benzyl alcohol and diethylene glycol monoethyl ether, comes within tariff heading 3808 of the CN, as an ‘insecticide’, subject to the assessment by the referring court of all the facts at its disposal.

The follow-up judgement of the Regional Court n. 64 Af 9/2018-64, 6 April 2021. 

The Regional Court in Brno referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Should the rule set out in point 2(a) of part E of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 be interpreted such that, with respect to a food intended for an end consumer in the Czech Republic, a compound ingredient listed in point 2(c) of part A of Annex I to Directive 2000/36/EC ² of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption, as amended, may only be listed among the ingredients of the product without a precise specification of its composition if that compound ingredient is labelled precisely in line with the Czech language version of Annex I to Directive 2000/36/EC?

Referral decision of the Regional Court n. 31 A 172/2017-119, 25 October 2019. 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-881/19, 13 January 2022, ruled that:

"Point 2(a) of Part E of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, must be interpreted as meaning that an economic operator, when labelling products marketed in the territory of a Member State, is exempt from the obligation to list all the ingredients constituting a compound ingredient, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(h) of that regulation, only if that compound ingredient, which is the subject of a sales name under Part A of Annex I to Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption, is designated in the list of ingredients using that sales name, in the language version of the Member State concerned."

The follow-up judgement of the Regional Court n. 31 A 172/2017-87, 26 February 2019. 

The Regional Court in Ostrava lodged on 18 June 2019 its request for preliminary ruling:

Does the existence of express national legislation relating to [joint and several] liability for missing tax in a fraudulent chain preclude tax administration authorities from refusing the person held liable under that legislation the right to deduct value added tax in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on VAT fraud? Is such a practice in that situation precluded by Article 17(1), Article 20, Article 52(1), Article 52(6), and Article 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

The Court of Justice ruled by the order of 14 November 2019 that the request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě is manifestly inadmissible.

The Area Court in Prague 9 referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

1/ Is a break period in which an employee must be available to his employer within two minutes, in case there is an emergency call out, to be considered ‘working time’ within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time?

2/ Is the assessment to be made in relation to the question above influenced by the fact that such interruption [of the break] in the event of an emergency call-out occurs only at random and unpredictably or, as the case may be, by how often such interruption occurs?

3/ Can a court of first instance, ruling after its decision has been set aside by a higher court and the case referred back to it for further proceedings, fail to comply with a legal opinion pronounced by the higher court and which is binding on the court of first instance if that opinion conflicts with EU law? 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-107/19, ruled that:

1/ Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working times must be interpreted as meaning that the break granted to a worker during his or her daily working time, during which the worker must be ready to respond to a call-out within a time limit of two minutes if necessary, constitutes ‘working time’ within the meaning of that provision, where it is apparent from an overall assessment of all the relevant circumstances that the limitations imposed on that worker are such as to affect objectively and very significantly the worker’s ability to manage freely the time during which his or her professional services are not required and to devote that time to his or her own interests.

2/ The principle of primacy of EU law must be interpreted as precluding a national court, ruling following the setting aside of its judgment by a higher court, from being bound, in accordance with national procedural law, by the legal rulings of that higher court, where those assessments are not compatible with EU law.

By order of 11 April 2019, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the request for a preliminary ruling was inadmissible.

The District Court in Ostrava referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Do the combined provisions of Article 8 and Article 23 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC preclude national legislation which specifies that the penalty for failure to fulfil the creditor’s obligation to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness before the conclusion of the credit agreement shall be the nullity of the credit agreement linked with an obligation on the consumer to return the principal sum to the creditor at a time appropriate to the consumer’s financial capacity, where such a penalty (the nullity of the credit agreement) is however applicable only in the event that the consumer invokes it (that is, raises an objection of nullity in relation to the agreement) within a three-year limitation period?

2/ Do the combined provisions of Article 8 and Article 23 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC require a national court to apply of its own motion the penalty laid down in national legislation for failure to fulfil the creditor’s obligation to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness (that is, even in the event that the consumer does not actively invoke the penalty)?

Referral decision of the District Court in Ostrava of 5 November 2018.

The Court of Justice in judgement C-679/21, 5 March 2020, ruled that:

"Articles 8 and 23 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC must be interpreted as imposing an obligation on a national court to examine, of its own motion, whether there has been a failure to comply with the creditor’s pre-contractual obligation to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness, provided for in Article 8 of that directive, and to draw the consequences arising under national law of a failure to comply with that obligation, on condition that they satisfy the requirements of Article 23. Articles 8 and 23 of Directive 2008/48 must also be interpreted as precluding national rules under which a failure by the creditor to comply with its pre-contractual obligation to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness is penalised by the nullity of the credit agreement, linked with an obligation on the consumer to return the principal sum to the creditor at a time appropriate to the consumer’s financial capacity, solely on condition that that consumer raises an objection of such nullity within a three-year limitation period."

The follow-up judgement of the District Court in Ostrava n. 24 C 156/2018-111, 30 June 2020.

The District Court in České Budějovice referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Must Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims be interpreted as meaning that a claim which has been decided on after taking evidence may be regarded as uncontested if neither the defendant, who acknowledged the debt before the commencement of the action, nor the guardian took part in the court proceedings, and they did not raise any objections in the course of the proceedings?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-518/18, 27 June 2019, ruled that:

Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court is unable to obtain the defendant’s address, it does not allow a judicial decision relating to a debt, made following a hearing attended by neither the defendant nor the guardian ad litem appointed for the purpose of the proceedings, to be certified as a European Enforcement Order.

The Municipal Court in Prague referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

1/ Is there an obligation on a Community carrier to pay compensation to passengers under Article 3(5), second sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 1 where the Community carrier as the contractual carrier operated the first leg of a flight with a stopover at an airport in a non-Member State, from which, under a code sharing agreement, a carrier which is not a Community carrier operated the second leg of the flight and there was a delay of more than three hours in the arrival at the final destination airport which arose exclusively in the second leg of the flight?

The Court of Justice in judgement n. C-502/18, 11 July 2019, ruled that:

Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, read together with Article 3(5) of Regulation No 261/2004, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of connecting flights, where there are two flights that are the subject of a single reservation, departing from an airport located within the territory of a Member State and travelling to an airport located in a non-Member State via the airport of another non-Member State, a passenger who suffers a delay in reaching his or her destination of 3 hours or more, the cause of that delay arising in the second flight, operated, under a code-share agreement, by a carrier established in a non-Member State, may bring his or her action for compensation under that regulation against the Community air carrier that performed the first flight.

The Regional Court in Prague referred on 18 June 2018 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Must any taxable person be regarded as a taxable person within the meaning of Article 138(2)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value-added tax (‘the VAT Directive’)? If not, to which taxable persons does that provision apply?

2/ If the Court of Justice’s answer is that Article 138(2)(b) of the VAT Directive applies to a situation such as that in the main proceedings (that is, the acquirer of the products is a taxable person registered for tax), must that provision be interpreted as meaning that, where the dispatch or transport of those products takes place in accordance with the relevant provisions of Council Directive 2008/118/EC  concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC (‘the Excise Duty Directive’), a supply connected with a procedure under the Excise Duty Directive must be regarded as a supply entitled to exemption under that provision, even though the conditions for exemption under Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive are not otherwise satisfied, having regard to the assignment of the transport of goods to another transaction?

3/ If the Court of Justice’s answer is that Article 138(2)(b) of the VAT Directive does not apply to a situation such as that in the main proceedings, is the fact that the goods are transported under an excise duty suspension arrangement decisive for deciding the question of which of several successive supplies a transport is to be ascribed to for the purposes of the right to exemption from VAT under Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive?

4/ Is ‘the right to dispose of the goods as owner’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive acquired by a taxable person who buys goods from another taxable person directly for a specific customer in order to fulfil an already existing order (identifying the type of goods, the quantity, place of origin and time of delivery) where he does not physically handle the goods himself since, in the context of concluding the contract of sale, his buyer agrees to arrange transport of the goods from their point of origin, so that he will only provide access to the requested goods via his suppliers and communicate the information necessary for acceptance of the goods (on his own behalf or on behalf of his sub-suppliers in the chain), and his profit from the transaction is the difference between the buying-in price and the selling price of such goods without the cost of transporting the goods being invoiced in the chain?

5/ Does the Excise Duty Directive establish (for example, in Article 4(1), Article 17 or Article 19), either directly or indirectly through a limit on the effective handling of such goods, sufficient conditions for the transfer of the ‘right to dispose of the goods (that are subject to excise duty) as the owner’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive, with the result that the taking over of the goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement by an authorised warehousekeeper or registered consignee in accordance with the conditions arising from the Excise Duty Directive should be treated as a supply of goods for VAT purposes?

6/ In this context, when considering the determination of a supply which is linked to transport within a chain of supply of goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement with a single transport, is it necessary to regard a transport in the sense of the VAT Directive as commencing and closing in accordance with Article 20 of the Excise Duty Directive?

7/ Does the principle of VAT neutrality or any other principle of EU law prevent application of the constitutional principle of in dubio mitius in national law, which obliges the public authorities, where legal rules are ambiguous and objectively offer a number of possible interpretations, to choose the interpretation that benefits the person subject to the legal rule (here the taxable person for VAT)? Would the application of this principle be compatible with EU law at least if it were limited to situations where the relevant facts of the case preceded a binding interpretation of a disputed legal question by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has determined that another interpretation less favourable to the taxable entity is correct?

If it is possible to apply the principle of in dubio mitius:

8/ Was it possible, in terms of the limits set by EU law at the time when the taxable transactions took place in this case (November 2010 to May 2013), to consider the question whether the legal concept of supply of goods or transport of goods has (or does not have) the same content both for the purposes of the VAT Directive and for the purposes of the Excise Duty Directive objectively as legally uncertain and offering two interpretations?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-401/18, 23 April 2020, ruled that:

1/ Article 20 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person which carries out a single intra-Community transport of goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement, with the intention of purchasing those goods for the purposes of its economic activity once they have been released for free circulation in the Member State of destination, acquires the right to dispose of the goods as owner, within the meaning of that provision, provided that it has the right to take decisions which are capable of affecting the legal situation of the goods, including, inter alia, the decision to sell them;
The fact that that taxable person had, at the outset, the intention to purchase those goods for the purposes of its economic activity once they have been released for free circulation in the Member State of destination is a circumstance which must be taken into account by the national court in its overall assessment of all of the particular circumstances of the case before it in order to determine to which of the successive acquisitions the intra-Community transport is to be ascribed.

2/ EU law precludes a national court that is confronted with a provision of national tax law, which has transposed a provision of Directive 2006/112 and is open to several interpretations, from adopting the interpretation that is most favourable to the taxable person by relying on the constitutional principle of in dubio mitius under national law, even after the Court has held that such an interpretation is incompatible with EU law.

The Regional Court in Ostrava-branch court in Olomouc referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/23 ¹ of 5 January 2015, in which the goods described in column 1 of the table in the annex are classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature, valid?

2/ If that Regulation is invalid, could the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 322 19 00 of the Combined Nomenclature?

3/ If that Regulation is valid, must the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-306/18, 15 May 2019, ruled that:

“The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1101/2014 of 16 October 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that welded steel parts such as those at issue in the main proceedings must, subject to the referring court’s assessment of all the factual information available to it, be classified under CN heading 7307, as ‘tube or pipe fittings’.”

The Area Court in Prague 8 referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Did a contractual relationship exist between the applicant and the defendant for the purposes of Article 5(1) of [Council] Regulation No 44/2001 1 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, even though no contract had been concluded between the applicant and the defendant and the flight was part of a package of services provided on the basis of a contract between the applicant and a third party (travel agency)?

2/ Can that relationship be qualified as a consumer relationship in accordance with Section 4, Article 15 to Article 17 of [Council] Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters?

3/ Does the defendant have legal capacity to be sued in an action seeking satisfaction of the claims arising from Regulation [(EC)] No 261/2004 [of the European Parliament and of the Council] of 11 February 2004, establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-215/18, ruled that:

1/ Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that a passenger on a flight which has been delayed for three hours or more may bring an action for compensation under Articles 6 and 7 of that regulation against the operating air carrier, even if that passenger and that air carrier have not entered into a contract between them and the flight in question forms part of a package tour covered by Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours.

2/ Article 5(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action for compensation brought pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 by a passenger against the operating air carrier comes within the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of that provision, even if no contract was concluded between those parties and the flight operated by that air carrier was provided for by a package travel contract, also including accommodation, concluded with a third party.

3/ Articles 15 to 17 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action for compensation brought by a passenger against the operating air carrier, with which that passenger has not concluded a contract, does not come within the scope of those articles relating to special jurisdiction over consumer contracts.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Is Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that a person, such as the applicant in the main proceedings, who engages in trade on FOREX, the international currency exchange market, on the basis of actively placing his own orders, although through a third party who is professionally engaged in that trade, must be regarded as a consumer under that provision?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-208/18, 3 October 2019, ruled that:

Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who, under a contract such as a CfD concluded with a brokerage company, carries out transactions on the international FOREX (foreign exchange) market through that company, must be classified as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of that provision if the conclusion of that contract does not fall within the scope of that person’s professional activity, which it is for the national court to ascertain. For the purpose of that classification, on the one hand, factors such as the value of transactions carried out under contracts such as financial contracts for differences, the extent of the risks of financial loss associated with the conclusion of such contracts, any knowledge or expertise that person has in the field of financial instruments or his or her active conduct in the context of such transactions are, as such, in principle irrelevant, and, on the other, the fact that the financial instruments do not fall within the scope of Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) or that that person is a ‘retail client’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(12) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC is, as such, in principle irrelevant.

The District Court in České Budějovice referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

Must Article 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2011/7/EU ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating late payment in commercial transactions be interpreted as requiring the court to award a successful applicant in a dispute concerning the recovery of a debt under a commercial transaction defined in Article 3 or 4 of that directive the sum of EUR 40 (or the equivalent in national currency) as well as compensation for costs of the court proceedings, including compensation for costs of a reminder to the defendant before the bringing of the action, in the amount laid down by the procedural provisions of the Member State?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-287/17, 13 September 2018, ruled that:

“Article 6 of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions must be interpreted as recognising that a creditor claiming compensation for the costs associated with sending reminders to a debtor due to the latter’s late payment is entitled to obtain reasonable compensation, on that basis and in addition to the fixed amount of EUR 40 laid down in Article 6(1) of that directive, for the purposes of Article 6(3) thereof, in respect of the part of those costs which exceeds that fixed amount.”

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Is Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure to be interpreted to the effect that a failure to notify the addressee of the possibility of refusing to accept the documents to be served, as provided for under Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 ² of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 ³ (‘the Service of documents Regulation’), gives grounds for a right on the part of the defendant (the addressee) to apply for review of the European order for payment under Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (‘the European order for payment Regulation’)?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-21/17, 6 September 2018, ruled that:

“Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure and Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a European order for payment is served on the defendant without the application for the order, annexed to the order, being written in or accompanied by a translation into a language he is deemed to understand, as required by Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007, the defendant must be duly informed, by means of the standard form in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007, of his right to refuse to accept the document in question.

If that formal requirement is omitted, the procedure must be regularised in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 1393/2007, by communicating to the addressee the standard form in Annex II to that regulation.

In that case, as a result of the procedural irregularity affecting the service of the European order for payment together with the application for the order, the order does not become enforceable and the period in which the defendant may lodge a statement of opposition cannot start to run, so that Article 20 of Regulation No 1896/2006 cannot apply.”

The District Court in Náchod referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Does the Czech legislation under which judges are not entitled to remuneration for on-call duty, even though other employees (in the public and private sectors) are entitled to that remuneration on the basis of the Zákoník práce (Labour Code) or other provisions of law, constitute unequal treatment in the field of pay, prohibited by Council Directive 2000/78/EC? ¹

Does the Czech legislation under which all judges (according to the number of years credited) are entitled to the same salary, even though all of them perform a different number of hours of on-call duty, constitute unequal treatment in the field of pay, prohibited by Council Directive 2000/78/EC?

The Court of Justice dismissed the request for a preliminary ruling as manifestly inadmissible.

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

1/ Must Article 22(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 ¹ of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels I Regulation’) be interpreted as also covering proceedings for the review of the reasonableness of the consideration which a majority shareholder is required to provide, as equivalent value for participating securities, to the previous owners of participating securities which were transferred to it as a result of a decision at a general meeting of a public limited company on the compulsory transfer of the other participating securities to that majority shareholder (otherwise known as a ‘squeeze out’), where the resolution adopted at the general meeting of the public limited company determines the amount of the reasonable consideration and where there is a court decision granting entitlement to a different amount of consideration which is binding on the majority shareholder and on the company as regards the basis of the right granted, as well as vis-a-vis the other owners of the participating securities?

2/ If the answer to the preceding question is [in the] negative, must Article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation be interpreted as also covering proceedings for review of the reasonableness of the consideration described in the previous question?

3/ If the answer to both the preceding questions is in the negative, must Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation be interpreted as also covering proceedings for review of the reasonableness of the consideration described in the first question?

The Court of Justice ruled in judgement C-560/16, 7 March 2018, that:

“Article 22(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, for review of the reasonableness of the consideration that the principal shareholder of a company is required to pay to the minority shareholders of that company in the event of the compulsory transfer of their shares to that principal shareholder comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which that company is established.”

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Can medicinal products as defined in Directive 2001/83/EC ¹ of the European Parliament and of the Council, which contain ‘scheduled substances’ as laid down by Regulation (EU) No 273/2004 ² of the European Parliament and of the Council, be regarded as excluded, on the basis of Article 2(a) of that regulation, from the scope of the Regulation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Joined Cases C-627/13 and C-2/14, even after amendment of that provision by Regulation No 1258/2013 ³ and in view of the fact that Article 2(a) of Regulation No 111/2005 ⁴ as amended by Regulation No 1259/2013 ⁵ brings medicinal products containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine within the system laid down by Regulation No 111/2005?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-497/16, 2 March 2017, ruled that:

“‘Medicinal products’, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, which contain ‘scheduled substances’, within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug precursors, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1258/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013, such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, remain excluded from the scope of Regulation No 273/2004 following the entry into force of Regulation No 1258/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Union and third countries in drug precursors.”

Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. The third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as meaning that the tenant of market halls who sublets the various sales points situated in those halls to market-traders, some of whom use their pitches in order to sell counterfeit branded products, falls within the concept of ‘an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right’ within the meaning of that provision.

2. The third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48 must be interpreted as meaning that the conditions for an injunction within the meaning of that provision against an intermediary who provides a service relating to the letting of sales points in market halls are identical to those for injunctions which may be addressed to intermediaries in an online marketplace, set out by the Court in the judgment of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others (C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474).”

The judgment of the ECJ of 7 July 2016, Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC and Others v DELTA CENTER a.s. (C-494/15) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Ostrava referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Do the provisions of Article 4 of Directive 2003/59/EC ¹ preclude national legislation which imposes further conditions for exemption from the requirement on drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers to obtain an initial qualification? 

The Court of Justice in judgement C-447/15, 7 July 2016, ruled that:

“Article 4 of Directive 2003/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 and Council Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76/914/EEC must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, before the driving activity in question may be carried out, periodic training of 35 hours duration has to be completed by persons who are exempted, under Article 4, from the requirement that drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers obtain an initial qualification."

The Supreme Court referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

The reference has been made in proceedings between NEW WAVE CZ, a.s., the holder of the word mark MegaBabe, and ALLTOYS, spol. s r. o. concerning the use of that mark by ALLTOYS without NEW WAVE’s consent.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as applying to a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which, after the definitive termination of proceedings in which it was held that an intellectual property right was infringed, the applicant in separate proceedings seeks information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or services by which that intellectual property right is infringed.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 18 January 2017, NEW WAVE CZ, a.s. v ALLTOYS, spol. s r. o. (C-427/15) can be found here.

The Area Court in Prague 6 referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

Is a collision between an aircraft and a bird an event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Wallentin-Hermann, Case C-549/07, EU:C:2008:771 (‘Wallentin-Hermann’), or does it constitute extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 261/2004  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishin

constitutes the event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of Wallentin-Hermann?If a collision between an aircraft and a bird is an event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of Wallentin-Hermann, may it also be considered to be an event within the meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to the Regulation and may, in such a case, the body of technical and administrative measures which an air carrier must implement following a collision between an aircraft and a bird which nevertheless did not result in damage to the aircraft be considered to constitute exceptional circumstances within the

meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to the Regulation? If the body of technical and administrative measures taken following a collision between an aircraft and a bird which nevertheless did not result in damage to the aircraft constitutes exceptional circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to the Regulation, is it permissible to require, as reasonable measures, the air carrier to take into consideration, when it plans flights, the risk that it will be necessary to take such technical and administrative measures following a collision between an aircraft and a bird and to make provision for that fact in the flight schedule? How must the obligation on the air carrier to pay compensation, as provided for in Article 7 of the Regulation, be assessed where the delay is caused not only by administrative and technical measures adopted following a collision between the aircraft and a bird which did not result in damage to the aircraft, but also to a significant extent by repairing a technical problem unconnected with that collision?

The Court of Justice in judgement C-315/15, 4 May 2017, ruled that:

“1. Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, read in the light of recital 14 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a collision between an aircraft and a bird is classified under the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of that provision.

2. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, read in the light of recital 14 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that cancellation or delay of a flight is not due to extraordinary circumstances when that cancellation or delay is the result of the use by the air carrier of an expert of its choice to carry out fresh safety checks necessitated by a collision with a bird after those checks have already been carried out by an expert authorised under the applicable rules.

3. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, read in the light of recital 14 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘reasonable measures’ which an air carrier must take in order to reduce or even prevent the risks of collision with a bird and thus be released from its obligation to compensate passengers under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 include control measures preventing the presence of such birds provided that, in particular at the technical and administrative levels, such measures can actually be taken by that air carrier, that those measures do not require it to make intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking and that that carrier has shown that those measures were actually taken as regards the flight affected by the collision with a bird, it being for the referring court to satisfy itself that those conditions have been met.

4. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, read in the light of recital 14 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a delay to a flight equal to or in excess of three hours in arrival caused not only by extraordinary circumstances, which could not have been avoided by measures appropriate to the situation and which were subject to all reasonable measures by the air carrier to avoid the consequences thereof, but also in other circumstances not in that category, the delay caused by the first event must be deducted from the total length of the delay in arrival of the flight concerned in order to assess whether compensation for the delay in arrival of that flight must be paid as provided for in Article 7 of that regulation.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 4 May 2017, MP and JP v Travel Service a.s. (C-315/15) can be found here.

The Supreme Court on 25 August 2014 referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

 The request has been made in proceedings brought by MM in her capacity as a court commissioner, in order to determine jurisdiction to approve the agreement on the sharing-out of the estate concluded by the guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that the approval of an agreement for the sharing-out of an estate concluded by a guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children constitutes a measure relating to the exercise of parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) of that regulation and thus falls within the scope of the latter, and not a measure relating to succession, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(f) thereof, excluded from the scope thereof.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 6 October 2015, Proceedings brought by Marie Matoušková (C-404/14) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Prague on 21 September 2015 referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request has been made in proceedings between Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC, Urban Trends Trading BV, Rado Uhren AG, Facton Kft., Lacoste SA and Burberry Ltd and Delta Center a.s. regarding injunctions which the applicants in the main proceedings want to see granted against Delta Center for the purposes of compliance with their intellectual property rights.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in insolvency proceedings does not permit, firstly, the court hearing the action to examine of its own motion any unfairness of contractual terms on which the claims declared in those proceedings are based, even when that court has available to it the matters of law and fact necessary to that end, and which, secondly, permits that court to examine only unsecured claims, solely in respect of a restricted number of complaints related to whether they are time-barred or have been paid.

2. Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that it requires a national court hearing a dispute concerning claims based on a credit agreement within the meaning of that directive to examine of its own motion whether the obligation to provide information laid down in that provision has been complied with and to establish the consequences under national law of an infringement of that obligation, provided that the penalties satisfy the requirements of Article 23 of that directive.

3. Articles 3(1) and 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 and point I of Annex I to that directive must be interpreted as meaning that the total amount of the credit and the amount of the drawdown together designate the sums made available to the consumer, which excludes those used by the lender to pay the costs connected with the credit concerned and which are not actually paid to that consumer.

4. The provisions of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the amount of compensation required to be paid by a consumer who does not fulfil his obligations is disproportionately high, within the meaning of point 1(e) of the annex to that directive, it is necessary to evaluate the cumulative effect of all the penalty clauses in the contract in question, regardless of whether the creditor actually insists that they all be satisfied in full and that, if necessary, the national courts must, by virtue of Article 6(1) of that directive, establish all the consequences of the finding that certain terms are unfair, exclude all terms found to be unfair in order to ensure that the consumer is not bound by them.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 21 April 2016, EGR and HR v Finway a.s. (C-377/14) can be found here.

The Supreme Court 12 December 2014 referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference has been made in proceedings between Ms L, the mother of the children R and K, and Mr M, the father of those children, concerning the custody of those children, who are with their mother in Austria, whereas their father lives in the Czech Republic.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. Article 12(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as allowing, for the purposes of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility, the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State which is not that of the child’s habitual residence to be established even where no other proceedings are pending before the court chosen.

2. Article 12(3)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be considered that the jurisdiction of the court seised by one party of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility has been ‘accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings’ within the meaning of that provision where the defendant in those first proceedings subsequently brings a second set of proceedings before the same court and, on taking the first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of jurisdiction of that court.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 12 November 2014, L v M (C-656/13) can be found here.

The Area Court in Prague 1 lodged on 21 September 2015 its reference for a preliminary ruling.

The request has been made in proceedings between Hoštická a.s., Jaroslav Haškovec and Zemědělské družstvo Senice na Hané and Česká republika – Ministerstvo zemědělství (Czech Republic – Ministry of Agriculture) concerning their application for compensation for a loss suffered as a result of the methods for the grant of the separate sugar payment provided for under Czech law.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 126(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘the criteria adopted by the relevant Member States in 2006 and 2007’ includes the marketing year which the Member States must choose before 30 April 2006 as the representative period for the grant of the separate sugar payment, under Article 143ba(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001, as amended by Council Regulations (EC) No 319/2006 of 20 February 2006, No 2011/2006 of 19 December 2006 and No 2012/2006 of 19 December 2006.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 15 October 2014,Hoštická a.s. and Others v Česká republika — Ministerstvo zemědělství (C-561/13) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Ostrava referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 56 TFEU precludes legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which companies established in one Member State using workers employed and seconded by temporary employment agencies established in another Member State, but operating in the first Member State through a branch, are obliged to withhold tax and to pay to the first Member State an advance payment on the income tax due by those workers, whereas the same obligation is not imposed on companies established in the first Member State which use the services of temporary employment agencies established in that Member State.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 19 June 2014,Strojírny Prostějov v Odvolací finanční ředitelství (C-53/13) can be found here.

The Industrial Property Office on 29 January 2013 referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request has been made in proceedings between MF 7 a.s. and MAFRA a.s. concerning an application, made by MF 7, for a declaration that the trademarks Mladá fronta DNES and MLADÁ FRONTA DNES owned by MAFRA are invalid.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ordered that it has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Úřad průmyslového vlastnictví (Czech Republic) in its decision of 22 January 2013.

The order of the ECJ of 14 November 2013, MF 7 a.s. v MAFRA a.s. (C-49/13) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Plzeň on 24 July 2012 referred  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request has been made in proceedings between OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s., a musical works copyright collecting society, and Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s, a company managing a non-State health establishment providing spa treatment services, concerning the payment of copyright licence fees for the making available of works transmitted by radio or television in its bedrooms.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes the right of authors to authorise or prohibit the communication of their works, by a spa establishment which is a business, through the intentional distribution of a signal by means of television or radio sets in the bedrooms of the establishment’s patients. Article 5(2)(e), (3)(b) and (5) of that directive is not such as to affect that interpretation.

2. Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be relied on by a copyright collecting society in a dispute between individuals for the purpose of setting aside national legislation contrary to that provision. However, the national court hearing such a case is required to interpret that legislation, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive.

3. Article 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, and Articles 56 TFEU and 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which reserves the exercise of collective management of copyright in respect of certain protected works in the territory of the Member State concerned to a single copyright collecting society and thereby prevents users of such works, such as the spa establishment in the main proceedings, from benefiting from the services provided by another collecting society established in another Member State.

However, Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the imposition by that copyright collecting society of fees for its services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States (a comparison of the fee levels having been made on a consistent basis) or the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided are indicative of an abuse of a dominant position.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 27 February 2014OSA — Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s. (C-351/12) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Prague referred on 3 April 2012 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request has been made in the context of proceedings between RČ and the Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení (social security authorities of the Czech Republic) concerning the calculation of the capital value of the pension rights acquired by him in the national pension scheme that may be transferred, on his behalf, into the European Union pension scheme.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. On a proper construction of Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission, as amended by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004, a Member State may determine the amount of the capital value of pension rights by means of the actuarial equivalent, the flat-rate redemption value or by means of other methods, in so far as the amount to be transferred actually represents the pension rights acquired by virtue of the previous activities of the official concerned.

2. Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to Regulation No 259/68, as amended by Regulation No 723/2004, and Article 4(3) TEU must be interpreted as not precluding application of the method for calculating the capital value of pension rights acquired earlier, such as that defined in Czech law, even where that method results in the amount of capital to be transferred into the European Union pension scheme being set at a level of not even half the amount of the contributions paid by the official and his former employer into the national pension scheme.

3. Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to Regulation No 259/68, as amended by Regulation No 723/2004, and Article 4(3) TEU must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of calculating the amount of the capital value of pension rights acquired under the national pension scheme and intended to be transferred into the European Union pension scheme, account is not to be taken of the period during which the official had already participated in that scheme.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 5 December 2013,RČ v Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení (C-166/12) can be found here.

The High Court in Prague referred on 7 February 2012  the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request has been made in the context of enforcement proceedings relating to the recovery of a fine imposed on MB, a Czech national, in respect of a road traffic offence which he committed in Austria.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. The term ‘court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters’, set out in Article 1(a)(iii) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, is an autonomous concept of Union law and must be interpreted as covering any court or tribunal which applies a procedure that satisfies the essential characteristics of criminal procedure. The Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat in den Ländern (Austria) fulfils those criteria and must for that reason be regarded as coming within the scope of that term.

2. Article 1(a)(iii) of Framework Decision 2005/214, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as meaning that a person is to be regarded as having had the opportunity to have a case tried before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters in the situation where, prior to bringing his appeal, that person was required to comply with a pre-litigation administrative procedure. Such a court must have full jurisdiction to examine the case as regards both the legal assessment and the factual circumstances.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 14 November 2013, MB (C-60/12) can be found here.

The Municipal Court in Prague referred on 10 August 2011 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The request was made in the course of proceedings between Česká spořitelna, a.s., whose registered office is established in the Czech Republic, and GF, domiciled in Austria, concerning the interpretation of Articles 5(1)(a) and 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a natural person with close professional links to a company, such as its managing director or majority shareholder, cannot be considered to be a consumer within the meaning of that provision when he gives an aval on a promissory note issued in order to guarantee the obligations of that company under a contract for the grant of credit.

Therefore, that provision does not apply for the purposes of determining the court having jurisdiction over judicial proceedings by which the payee of a promissory note, established in one Member State, brings claims under that note, which was incomplete at the date of its signature and was subsequently completed by the payee, against the giver of the aval, domiciled in another Member State.

2. Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 applies for the purposes of determining the court having jurisdiction over judicial proceedings by which the payee of a promissory note, established in one Member State, brings claims under that note, which was incomplete at the date of its signature and was subsequently completed by the payee, against the giver of the aval, domiciled in another Member State.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 14 March 2013, Česká spořitelna, a.s. v GF (C-419/11) can be found here.

The Supreme Court referred on 2 November 2010 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference has been made in proceedings between Wolf Naturprodukte GmbH, a company established in Graz (Austria), and SEWAR spol. s r. o., a company established in Šanov (Czech Republic), concerning the recognition and enforcement in the Czech Republic of a judgment delivered in Austria.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 66(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, for that regulation to be applicable for the purpose of the recognition and enforcement of a judgment, it is necessary that at the time of delivery of that judgment the regulation was in force both in the Member State of origin and in the Member State addressed.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 21 June 2012, Wolf Naturprodukte GmbH proti SEWAR spol. s r. o. (C-514/10) can be found here.

The District Court in Cheb referred on 5 July 2010 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice:

The reference has been made in proceedings between Hypoteční banka a.s. and U.M.L., whose current address was unknown, seeking to secure payment of a sum of approximately 4.4 million Czech crowns (CZK), corresponding to the arrears on a mortgage loan which Hypoteční banka had granted to U.M.L.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that the application of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by that regulation requires that the situation at issue in the proceedings of which the court of a Member State is seised is such as to raise questions relating to determination of the international jurisdiction of that court. Such a situation arises in a case such as that in the main proceedings, in which an action is brought before a court of a Member State against a national of another Member State whose domicile is unknown to that court.

2. Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that:

– in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which a consumer who is a party to a long-term mortgage loan contract, which includes the obligation to inform the other party to the contract of any change of address, renounces his domicile before proceedings against him for breach of his contractual obligations are brought, the courts of the Member State in which the consumer had his last known domicile have jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 16(2) of that regulation, to deal with proceedings in the case where they have been unable to determine, pursuant to Article 59 of that regulation, the defendant’s current domicile and also have no firm evidence allowing them to conclude that the defendant is in fact domiciled outside the European Union;

– that regulation does not preclude the application of a provision of national procedural law of a Member State which, with a view to avoiding situations of denial of justice, enables proceedings to be brought against, and in the absence of, a person whose domicile is unknown, if the court seised of the matter is satisfied, before giving a ruling in those proceedings, that all investigations required by the principles of diligence and good faith have been undertaken with a view to tracing the defendant.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 17 November 2011, Hypoteční banka a.s. v U.M.L. (C-327/10) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Brno referred on 5 July 2010 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference has been made in the context of a dispute between various undertakings and the Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Czech competition authority) concerning the decision of that authority to fine them for infringement of Czech competition law.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“1. The provisions of Article 81 EC and Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a proceeding initiated after 1 May 2004, they do not apply to a cartel which produced effects, in the territory of a Member State which acceded to the Union on 1 May 2004, during periods prior to that date.

2. The opening by the European Commission of a proceeding against a cartel under Chapter III of Regulation No 1/2003 does not, pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, read in combination with Article 3(1) of the same regulation, cause the competition authority of the Member State concerned to lose its power, by the application of national competition law, to penalise the anti-competitive effects produced by that cartel in the territory of the said Member State during periods before the accession of the latter to the European Union.

The ne bis in idem principle does not preclude penalties which the national competition authority of the Member State concerned imposes on undertakings participating in a cartel on account of the anti-competitive effects to which the cartel gave rise in the territory of that Member State prior to its accession to the European Union, where the fines imposed on the same cartel members by a Commission decision taken before the decision of the said national competition authority was adopted were not designed to penalise the said effects.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 14 February 2012, Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (C-17/10) can be found here.

The District Court in Cheb referred on 23 March 2009 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference was submitted in the course of proceedings between Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group, an insurance company established in the Czech Republic, and M.B., a policyholder domiciled in Slovakia, regarding the payment of an insurance premium.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that the court seised, where the rules in Section 3 of Chapter II of that regulation were not complied with, must declare itself to have jurisdiction where the defendant enters an appearance and does not contest that court’s jurisdiction, since entering an appearance in that way amounts to a tacit prorogation of jurisdiction.”

The judgment of the ECJ of 20 May 2010, Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v M.B. (C-111/09) can be found here.

The Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem referred on 24 December 2007 the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference was submitted in the context of a dispute between RLRE Tellmer Property sro and the Finanční ředitelství v Ústí nad Labem (Tax Directorate of Ústí nad Labem) concerning the question whether the costs of cleaning the common parts in an apartment block are, like letting, exempt from value-added tax (‘VAT’).

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“For the purposes of applying Article 13B(b) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, the letting of immovable property and the cleaning service of the common parts of the latter must, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, be regarded as independent, mutually divisible operations, so that the said service does not fall within that provision.”

The judgment of the Court of 11 June 2009 (C-572/07, Recueil 2009) can be found here.

The case was removed from the register.

The Regional Court in Ostrava referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

The reference was submitted in the course of proceedings between the company Skoma-Lux sro (‘Skoma-Lux’) and the Celní ředitelství Olomouc (Olomouc customs directorate, ‘the customs directorate’), regarding a fine imposed on Skoma-Lux in respect of customs infringements which it is alleged to have committed between March and May 2004, on the ground that the customs directorate could not enforce against it Community legislation which had not yet been published in the Czech language in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Article 58 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession to the European Union of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, precludes the obligations contained in Community legislation which has not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union in the language of a new Member State, where that language is an official language of the European Union, from being imposed on individuals in that State, even though those persons could have learned of that legislation by other means.

In holding that a Community regulation which is not published in the language of a Member State is unenforceable against individuals in that State, the Court is interpreting Community law for the purposes of Article 234 EC.”

The judgment of the Court of 11 December 2007 (C-161/06, Receuil 2007, s. I-10841) can be found here.

The case was removed from the register.

The District Court in Prague 3 referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

This reference has been made in the context of proceedings where the opposing parties are Telefónica O2 Czech Republic as, formerly Český Telecom as (‘TO2’), and Czech On Line as (‘COL’) on the subject of the rejection by TO2 of a request, made by COL, for an extension of existing collaboration to broadband high-speed internet services (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line).

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“In accordance with the transitional provisions of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, the 'Access Directive') and of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the 'Framework Directive'), the Český telekomunikační úřad [Czech telecommunications regulatory authority] was entitled to consider the obligation, on the part of a telecommunications company with significant market power within the meaning of Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), as amended by Directive 98/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998, to conclude a contract for the interconnection of its networks with that of another operator, subsequent to 1 May 2004, within the context of the provisions of Directive 97/33, as amended.”

The judgment of the Court of 14 June 2007 (C-64/06, Receuil 2007, s. I-04887) can be found here. 

The District Court in Český Krumlov referred the following preliminary reference to the Court of Justice: 

This reference has been presented in the context of proceedings between Mr Jan Vorel and his employer, Nemocnice Český Krumlov (Český Krumlov Hospital) concerning the definition of the concept of ‘working time’ within the meaning of Directives 93/104 and 2003/88 relating to on-call duties provided by a doctor in a hospital and the remuneration due in respect of those duties.

The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.

The Court of Justice ruled that:

“Directive 93/104/EC of the Council of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time, as amended by Directive 2000/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 2000, and Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003, concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time should be interpreted as:

-    precluding national legislation under which on-call duty performed by a doctor under a system where he is expected to be physically present at the place of work, but in the course of which he does no actual work, is not treated as wholly constituting 'working time' within the meaning of the said directives;

-   not preventing a Member State from applying legislation on the remuneration of workers and concerning on-call duties performed by them at the workplace which makes a distinction between the treatment of periods in the course of which work is actually done and those during which no actual work is done, provided that such a system wholly guarantees the practical effect of the rights conferred on workers by the said directives in order to ensure the effective protection of their health and safety.”

Order of the Court of 11 January 2007 Vorel (Case C-437/05, Receuil 2007, s. I-00331) can be found here.