Lodged by the Supreme Administrative Court
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
Should indent five of Article 2(4) of Council Directive 2003/96 be interpreted to the effect that electricity used to power machines used in the processing of quarried limestone, in the form of multi-stage grinding and crushing down to specific grain size, both in the quarry where the quarrying takes place, and in nearby processing facilities, constitutes electricity used for mineralogical processes?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 27 February 2023, no. 8 Afs 297/2021-43) can be found here.
The Court of Justice has not ruled on the case yet.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Can an electric mobility vehicle whose maximum speed exceeds 10 km/hr, and which is equipped with a separate adjustable steering column, be classified under heading 8713 of the Combined Nomenclature, despite the Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of 6 May 2011 and 4 March 2015?
2) Does Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2009 apply – aside from the vehicles directly described therein – also to an electric mobility vehicle with the following characteristics:
- Four wheels (the rear pair of wheels are anti-tip);
- An adjustable and rotating seat with armrests,
- A horizontal platform between the front and rear sections of the mobility vehicle;
- An 800 W electric motor, enabling the attainment of a speed of up to 16 km/hr and a range of up to 45 km,
- An electromagnetic brake on the rear wheels;
- Closed handlebars mounted on a separate steering column that can be folded down and equipped with levers for speed selection?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 19 January 2023, no. 10 Afs 134/2020-114) can be found here.
The Court of Justice has not ruled on the case yet.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) What degree of distinction between individual data subjects is required by Article 4(1)(c) or Article 6 in conjunction with Article 10 of Directive 2016/680? Is it compliant with the obligation to minimise personal data processing, and with the obligation to distinguish between various categories of data subjects, for national law to permit the collection of genetic data in respect of all persons suspected or accused of having committed an intentional criminal offence?
2) Is it in accordance with Article 4(1)(e) of Directive 2016/680 if the necessity of continued retention of a DNA profile is assessed, with a reference to the general prevention, investigation, and detection of criminal activity, by Police authorities on the basis of their internal regulations, which frequently means in practice that sensitive personal data is retained for an unspecified period without a maximum limit for the duration of the retention of that personal data being set? If not, by what criteria should the proportionality of the period of the retention of the personal data collected and retained for that purpose be assessed?
3) In the case of particularly sensitive personal data falling under Article 10 of Directive 2016/680, what is the minimal scope of the substantive or procedural conditions for obtaining, retaining, and deleting such data that must be regulated by a ‘provision of general application’ in the law of a Member State? Can judicial case-law qualify as ‘Member State law’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) in conjunction with Article 10 of Directive 2016/680?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 26 January 2023, no. 7 As 172/2022-56) can be found here.
The Court of Justice has not ruled on the case yet.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
Must Article 138(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 9 December 2006? 2021 in Case C-154/20 Kemwater ProChemie, to the effect that the claim for exemption from value added tax (VAT) on the supply of goods to another Member State of the European Union must be denied without the tax authorities being obliged to prove that the supplier of the goods was involved in VAT fraud, where the supplier has not proved that the goods were supplied to a specific recipient in another EU Member State in the capacity of the taxable person indicated on the tax documents, even though, in the light of the facts and the information provided by the taxable person, the information necessary to verify that the actual recipient in the other EU Member State had that capacity is available?
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the reference by decision of 26 October 2022, No 4 Afs 291/2021-34.
The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
When verifying the validity of the interoperable vaccination, test and recovery certificates in relation to the covid-19 disease issued pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 April 2005 on the protection of human health. 2021 on a framework for the issuance, validation and recognition of interoperable certificates on vaccination, test and recovery in relation to COVID-19 (EU COVID digital certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, which are used by the Czech Republic for national purposes, the national application "čTečka" for automated processing of personal data within the meaning of Art. 4, indent 2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), and is thus within the material scope of the General Data Protection Regulation pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof?
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged the preliminary reference by decision of 12 October 2022, No 8 Ao 7/2022-71.
The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a request for preliminary ruling in case čj. 10 Ads 262/2020-34:
Does Article 2 of Directive 2008/94/EC 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, in conjunction with Article 12(a) and (c) thereof, preclude [the application of] national case-law according to which a CEO of a trading company is not deemed to be an ‘employee’ for the purpose of the satisfaction of pay claims pursuant to Directive 2008/94/EC, for the sole reason that the CEO as an employee is, at the same time, a member of the statutory body of the same trading company?
The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
Should Article 3(9) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) be interpreted such that a ‘substantial change’ of a plant includes an extension of the duration of waste disposal at a landfill without the maximum approved dimensions of the landfill or its total potential capacity changing at the same time?
The Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the case.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
1/Are products that are subject to excise duty transported pursuant to a suspension arrangement within the meaning of Article 4(c) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC in a situation where a customs office of one Member State agreed to the movement of products under a duty-suspension arrangement from a tax warehouse to a registered trader established in another Member State, even though the conditions for the movement of those products under the duty-suspension arrangement were objectively not met, it having been established at a subsequent stage of the procedure that the registered trader had no knowledge of the movement of the products, due to fraud by third parties?
2/ Does the provision of an excise duty guarantee, as provided for by Article 15(3) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC, issued for a purpose other than the movement of products under a duty-suspension arrangement between a tax warehouse and a registered trader established in another Member State preclude the due commencement of movement under a duty-suspension arrangement, if the provision of the guarantee was recorded in the accompanying documents for the movement of the products under the duty-suspension arrangement for the registered trader and confirmed by the customs authority of the Member State?
The judgment of the CJEU of 24 March 2022, C-711/20, can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
1/ Does ‘breeding stock’, as defined by Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, include specimens that are the parents of specimens bred by a given breeder, even though that breeder never owned or kept them?
2/ If the answer to the first question is that such parent specimens do not constitute a part of the breeding stock, are competent bodies authorised to verify, in examining compliance with the condition set in Article 54(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006, consisting of the establishment of stock legally and, at the same time, in a manner not detrimental to the survival of wild specimens, the origin of those parent specimens and to infer on that basis whether the breeding stock has been established in accordance with the rules set out in Article 54(2) of the Regulation?
3/ In examining compliance with the condition set out in Article 54(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006, consisting of the establishment of stock legally and, at the same time, in a manner not detrimental to the survival of wild specimens, can further circumstances of the case be taken into consideration (in particular, good faith in the transfer of the specimens and the legitimate expectation that trading in their potential offspring will be permitted, and potentially also the less stringent legislation applicable in the Czech Republic prior to the country’s accession to the European Union)?
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
„1.Is it compatible with Directive 2006/112/EC (1) for exercise of the right to deduct input value added tax to be conditional on the taxable person fulfilling the obligation to prove that the taxable supply received was made by another specific taxable person?
2.If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the taxable person fails to fulfil that evidentiary obligation, can the right to deduct input tax be refused without it being established that that taxable person knew or could have known that by acquiring the goods or services in question he was participating in tax fraud?“
The CJEU ruled that:
"Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the right to deduct input value added tax (VAT) must be refused, without the tax authorities having to prove that the taxable person committed VAT fraud or that he or she knew, or ought to have known, that the transaction relied on to establish the right of deduction was connected with such fraud, where, the true supplier of the goods or services concerned not having been identified, that taxable person fails to adduce proof that that supplier had the status of taxable person, provided that, taking into account the factual circumstances and the evidence produced by that taxable person, the information needed to verify that the true supplier had that status is lacking."
The judgment of the CJEU of 9 December 2018, C-154/20, can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
1/ „Does Article 56 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to national legislation (a binding measure of general application in the form of a municipal decree) prohibiting a certain service in part of one municipality, simply because some of the customers of a service provider affected by that legislation may come or do come from another Member State of the European Union?
2/ If so, is a mere assertion of the possible presence of customers from another Member State sufficient to trigger the applicability of Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or is the service provider obliged to prove the actual provision of services to customers who come from other Member States?
Is it of any relevance to the answer to the first question that:
(a) the potential restriction on the freedom to provide services is significantly limited in both geographical and substantive terms (potential applicability of a de minimis exception);
(b) it does not appear that the national legislation regulates in a different manner, in law or in fact, the position of entities providing services primarily to citizens of other Member States of the European Union, on the one hand, and that of entities focusing on a domestic clientele, on the other? “
The Court of Justice in judgement of 3 December 2020, C-311/19, ruled that:
"Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to the situation of a company established in a Member State which has lost its licence to operate games of chance following the entry into force, in that Member State, of legislation determining the places in which it is permitted to organise such games, which is applicable without distinction to all service providers operating in that Member State, regardless of whether those services are provided to nationals of that Member State or to those of other Member States, where some of its customers come from a Member State other than the Member State in which it is established."
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
Is it consistent with European Union law and in particular with the principle of VAT neutrality for a Member State to adopt a measure which makes the assessment and payment of part of a VAT deduction claimed conditional on the completion of a procedure applying to all taxable transactions in a given tax period?
The CJEU ruled that:
Articles 179, 183 and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, read in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not allow the tax authority, before the end of a tax inspection procedure relating to a value added tax (VAT) return showing an excess for a given tax period, to refund that part of the excess relating to transactions which are not covered by that procedure at the time it was initiated, provided that it is not possible to establish in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner that a VAT excess, the amount of which may potentially be lower than the amount relating to the transactions not covered by that procedure, will exist regardless of the outcome of that procedure, which is a matter for the referring court to ascertain.
The judgement of the CJEU of 14 May 2020, C-446/18, can be found here.
31. Case C-405/18 AURES Holdings, a. s., v Odvolací finanční ředitelství (Appellate Tax Directorate)
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
Can the concept of freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU be held to cover a simple transfer of the place of a company’s management from one Member State to another Member State?
If so, is it contrary to Article 49, Article 52 and Article 54 TFEU for national law not to allow an entity from another Member State, when relocating its place of business or place of management to the Czech Republic, to claim a tax loss incurred in that other Member State?
The CJEU ruled that:
1/ Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a company incorporated under the law of a Member State, which transfers its place of effective management to another Member State without that transfer affecting its status as a company incorporated under the law of the first Member State, may rely on that article for the purposes of contesting a refusal in the second Member State to defer losses prior to that transfer.
2/ Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which excludes the possibility for a company, which has transferred its place of effective management and, as a result, its tax residency to that Member State, from claiming a tax loss incurred, prior to that transfer, in another Member State, in which it has retained its registered seat.
The judgment of the CJEU of 27 February 2020, C-405/18, can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Articles 131 and 146 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value-added tax in a case concerning the refusal of the tax authorities to exempt from value-added tax various supplies of goods to a destination outside the European Union by the resolution No. 8 Afs 252/2016-60 of 28 March 2018.
The full text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The CJEU ruled that:
"Article 146(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 131 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding a national legislative provision from making the exemption from value added tax for goods intended to be exported outside the European Union conditional on the goods being placed under the export customs procedure, in a situation in which it is established that the substantive conditions of exemption, in particular the condition that the goods concerned actually leave the territory of the European Union, are satisfied."
The judgment of the CJEU of 28 March 2019, C-275/18 can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, and of Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/ECon the common system of value-added tax in a case concerning the Appellate Finance Directorate's refusal to grand A-PACK CZ an adjustment of the amount of value-added tax paid in respect of unpaid debts considered to be irrecoverable as a result of the debtor's insolvency.
The full text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The CJEU ruled that:
"Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that a taxable person cannot correct the value added tax (VAT) taxable amount, in the case of total or partial non-payment, by its debtor, of a sum due in respect of a transaction subject to that tax, if the debtor is no longer a taxable person for the purposes of VAT."
The judgment of the CJEU of 8 May 2019, C-127/18 can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court has referred to the Court of Justice the following question:
Does the interpretation of Article 9 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96) in conjunction with Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude national legislation which does not allow the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) to review a judicial decision concerning detention of a foreign national after the foreign national has been released from detention?
The Supreme Administrative Court withdrew the request for preliminary ruling by the resolution No. 10 Azs252/2017-68 of 31 January 2019. The Constitutional Court repealed the contentious provisions of the Asylum Act and the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals in the Czech Republic. The judgment of the Constitutional Court No. Pl. ÚS 41/17 of 27 November 2018 can be found here (only in Czech).
The President of the ECJ has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a request for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning excise duties by the resolution No. 9 Afs 137/2016-60 of 29 June 2017.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceeding concerning the deduction of value-added tax in respect of purchases of fuel, form Czech suppliers, which was transported under an excise duty suspension arrangement from Austria to the Czech Republic.
The full text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The CJEU ruled that:
"1. Article 2(1)(b)(iii) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to intra-Community acquisitions of excise goods, in respect of which the excise duty is chargeable in the Member State of destination of the dispatch or transport of those goods, carried out by a taxable person whose other acquisitions are not subject to value added tax pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive.
2. Article 2(1)(b)(iii) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, in a chain of successive transactions which gave rise only to a single intra-Community transport of excise goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement, the acquisition carried out by the trader liable for payment of the excise duty in the Member State of destination of the dispatch or transport of those goods cannot be classified as an intra-Community acquisition subject to value added tax under that provision, where that transport cannot be ascribed to that acquisition.
3. Article 2(1)(b)(i) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, where there is a chain of successive acquisitions concerning the same excise goods and which gave rise only to a single intra-Community transport of those goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement, the fact that those goods are transported under that arrangement does not constitute a decisive factor in determining to which acquisition the transport is to be ascribed for the purposes of applying value added tax under that provision."
The judgment of the ECJ of 19 December 2018 AREX CZ v Apellate tax directorate (C-414/16) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning freedom of establishment and approximation of laws by the resolution No. 9 As 176/2016-50 of 2 December 2016.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceeding concerning an inspection initiated by the latter in respect of Corporates Companies’ compliance with the requirements set out in the national law transposing Directive 2005/60.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled that: “[a]rticle 2(1), point 3(c) of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, read in conjunction with Article 3, point 7(a) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a person, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, whose commercial activity consists in selling companies which it formed itself, without any prior request on the part of its potential clients, for the purposes of sale to those clients, by means of a transfer of its shares in the capital of the company being sold, falls within the scope of those provisions”.
The judgment of the CJEU of 17 January 2018 CORPORATE COMPANIES s. r. o. v Ministry of Finance (C-676/16) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning asylum policy by the resolution No. 5 Azs 189/2015-36 of 16 June 2016.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceeding between M and the Ministry of Interior concerning the decision revoking his right to asylum.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled that: “Consideration of Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of those provisions in the light of Article 78(1) TFEU and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”
The judgment of the CJEU of 6 April 2017, Eko-Tabak s. r. o. v Generální ředitelství cel (C-638/15) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning excise duty by the resolution No. 5 Afs 26/2015–29 of 29 October 2015.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceeding concerning the confiscation of goods considered to be manufactured tobacco subject to excise duty.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled that: “[a]rticle 2(1)(c) and Article 5(1) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco must be interpreted as meaning that dried, flat, irregular, partly stripped leaf tobacco and/or parts thereof which have undergone primary drying and controlled dampening, which contain glycerine and which are capable of being smoked after simple processing by means of crushing or hand-cutting, fall within the definition of ‘smoking tobacco’ for the purpose of those provisions.”
The judgment of the CJEU of 6 April 2017, Eko-Tabak s. r. o. v Generální ředitelství cel (C-638/15) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning the evaluation of the risk of absconding of a foreigner by the resolution No. 10 Azs 122/2015–88 of 24 September 2015.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in an appeal on o point of law brought by the Police Force of the Czech Republic, Regional Police Directorate of the Ústí nad Labem Region, Foreigners Police Section, concerning the annulment, by a lower court, of the decision taken by Foreigners Police Section to detain “Al Chodors” for 30 days to transfer them to Hungary.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled that: [a]rticle 2(n) and Article 28(2) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, read in conjunction, must be interpreted as requiring Member States to establish, in a binding provision of general application, objective criteria underlying the reasons for believing that an applicant for international protection who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond. The absence of such a provision leads to the inapplicability of Article 28(2) of that regulation.
The judgment of the CJEU of 5 March 2017, Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie v A. Ch. (C-528/15) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning value-added tax by the resolution No. 8 Afs 96/2013-42 of 7 July 2015.
The request has been made in proceedings regarding the imposition of the amount of VAT borne directly by the various cost components.
The text of the request for preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled:
1. Article 2(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted to the effect that the supply of a horse by its owner, who is a taxable person for value added tax purposes, to the organiser of a horse race for the purpose of the horse’s participation in that race does not constitute a supply of services for consideration within the meaning of that provision where it does not give rise to a payment awarded for participation or any other direct remuneration and where only the owners of horses which are placed in the race receive a prize, even if that prize is determined in advance. On the other hand, such a supply of a horse for the purposes of its participation in the race constitutes a supply of services for consideration where it gives rise to the payment, by the organiser, of remuneration irrespective of whether or not the horse in question is placed in the race.
2. Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted to the effect that a taxable person, who breeds and trains his own race horses and those of other owners, has the right to deduct input value added tax on the transactions relating to the preparation for horse races of his own horses and the participation of his own horses in races, on the ground that the costs pertaining to those transactions are part of the general costs linked to his economic activity, provided that the costs incurred in each of those transactions have a direct and immediate link with that overall activity. That may be the case if the costs thus incurred pertain to race horses actually intended for sale or if the participation of those horses in races is, from an objective point of view, a means of promoting the economic activity, this being a matter for the referring court to determine.
In a situation where such a right to deduct exists, any prize won by the taxable person on account of the placing of one of his horses in a race is not to be included in the taxable amount for value added tax purposes.
3. Article 98 of the Directive 2006/112, read in conjunction with point 14 of Annex III thereto, must be interpreted to the effect that the reduced rate of value added tax may not be applied to a single composite supply of services, made up of several components relating, inter alia, to the training of horses, the use of sporting facilities and the stabling, feeding and other care provided to the horses where the use of the sporting facilities, within the meaning of point 14 of Annex III to that directive, and the training of the horses constitute two components of that composite supply having equal status or where the training of the horses constitutes the main component of that supply, this being a matter for the referring court to assess.
The judgment of the CJEU of 11th November 2016, Odvolací finanční ředitlství v Pavlína B. (C-432/15) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning electronic communication services by the resolution No. 7 As 131/2013-86 of 23 October 2014 as subsequently amended by the rectifying resolution No. 7 As 131/2013-99 of 9 December 2014.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceeding concerning the decision of the Czech telecommunications regulatory authority with the provision of the universal service for 2004 incurred by Telefónica Czech Republic a.s., now O2 Czech Republic a.s.
The text of a request for preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled:
1. Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) must be interpreted as not precluding the net cost of the universal service obligation including the ‘reasonable profit’ of the provider of that service, fixed at the rate of return on equity capital that would be required by an undertaking comparable to the universal service provider considering whether or not to provide the service of general economic interest for the whole duration of the period of entrustment, taking into account the level of risk.
2. Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2002/22 must be interpreted as having direct effect and they may be relied on directly before a national court by individuals to challenge a decision of a national regulatory authority.
3. Directive 2002/22 must be interpreted to the effect that it is not applicable for the purpose of determining the amount of the net cost of the obligations relating to the universal service provided by the designated undertaking during the period prior to the Czech Republic’s accession to the European Union, that is to say, for the year 2004, between 1 January and 30 April 2004.
The judgment of the CJEU of 6 October 2015, T-Mobile Czech Republic and Vodafone Czech Republic (C-508/14) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court requested a preliminary ruling in a case concerning charges for public radio broadcasting by the decision No. 5 Afs 124/2014-79 of 18 December 2014.
The request has been made in proceeding between the Appellate Tax Directorate and Český rozhlas (Czech Radio) concerning value-added tax (VAT) for which it was a liable connection with its public broadcasting activity.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled that „[a]rticle 2(1) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment must be interpreted as meaning that public broadcasting activities, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, funded by a compulsory statutory charge paid by owners or possessors of a radio receiver and carried out by a radio broadcasting company created by law, do not constitute a supply of services ‘effected for consideration’ within the meaning of that provision and therefore fall outside the scope of that directive.“
The judgement of CJEU of 22 June 2016 Odvolací finanční ředitelství v Český rozhlas (C-11/15) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning freedom of establishment by the resolution No. 2 Afs 51/2014-73 of the 13th August 2014.
The reference has been made in proceedings concerning a decision refusing to reimburse PST CLC customs duty that PSTCLC has paid for the importation products intended for use in computers consisting of a heat sink and a fan to release these products for free circulation.
The text of the request for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court stated as follows:
1. Point 2 of the table in the annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 384/2004 of 1 March 2004 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature was invalid during the time in which it was in force, namely from 22 March 2004 to 22 December 2009.
2. In so far the products at issue in the main proceedings consist of a heat sink and a fan and are intended exclusively for use in computers, which is a matter to be ascertained by the national court, they must be classified for tariff purposes on the basis of the general rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1214/2007 of 20 September 2007.
The full text order of the CJEU of 11 June 2015, PST CLC, a.s. v. Generální ředitelství cel (C-405/14) can be found here (only in French).
The order (information) of the CJEU of 11 June 2015, PST CLC (C-405/15) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning freedom of establishment and operation of bus town transport by the resolution No. 4 As 148/2013-94 of the 6th June 2014.
The text of a reference for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court stated as follows:
Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State requiring only foreign carriers which have a branch office in that Member State to obtain special authorisation issued on a discretionary basis by the competent authorities in order to operate an urban public transport service by road in the territory of that Member State alone.
The order of the CJEU of 21 May 2015, Slovenská autobusová doprava Trnava a.s. v Krajský úřad Olomouckého kraje(C-318/14) can be found here (only in French).
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning taxation of emission allowances by the resolution No. 1 Afs 6/2013-46 of the 18th December 2013.
The request has been made in proceedings concerning the payment of a tax on allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowance for the years 2011 and 2012.
The text of the reference for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The judgment of the CJEU of 26 February 2015, ŠKO-ENERGO, s. r. o. v. Tax Authority in Prague (C-43/14) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning coordination of social security systems No. 6 Ads 1/2012-38 of the 2th May 2013.
The reference has been made in proceedings concerning a decision withdrawing entitlement of claimant to family benefits on the ground that the Czech Republic does not have the competence to grant such benefits.
The text of the reference for a preliminary ruling can be found here.
The Court ruled that:
1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 592/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008, in particular Article 13 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from being regarded as the competent State for the purpose of granting a family benefit to a person on the sole ground that the person concerned is registered as being permanently resident in its territory, where neither that person nor the members of his family work or habitually reside in that Member State. Article 13 of that regulation must be interpreted as also precluding a Member State which is not the competent State in so far as concerns the person in question from granting family benefits to such a person unless there are specific and particularly close connecting factors between the situation at issue and the territory of that first Member State.
2) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 988/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009, in particular Article 11 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from being regarded as the competent State for the purpose of granting a family benefit to a person on the sole ground that the person concerned is registered as being permanently resident in its territory, where neither that person nor the members of his family work or habitually reside in that Member State.
The judgment of the CJEU of 11 September 2014, K. B. proti Ministerstvu práce a sociálních věcí (C-394/13) can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court can be found here (only in Czech).
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
Can the operation of a camera system installed on a family home for the purposes of the protection of the property, health and life of the owners of the home be classified as the processing of personal data ‘by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity’ within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, even though such a system monitors also a public space?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 20 March 2013, no. 1 As 113/2012-59) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 December 2014 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 25 February 2015, no. 1 As 113/2012-133) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Do Articles 18, 45, 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude provisions under which an employer established in one Member State is obliged to make advance payments of tax on the income of workers (nationals of another Member State) temporarily assigned to the employer by a temporary work agency established in another Member State through a branch established in the first Member State?
2) Do Articles 18, 45, 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude provisions under which the basis of assessment of such workers is set at a flat rate of at least 60% of the amount invoiced by the temporary work agency in cases where the intermediation fee is included in the amount invoiced?
3) If the answer to the first or second question is yes in the affirmative, is it possible, in a situation such as the present case, to restrict the said fundamental freedoms for reasons of public policy, public security or public health, or for the effectiveness of fiscal supervision?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 17 January 2013, no. 1 Afs 38/2012-53) can be found here.
The Court of Justice joined this case with case C-53/13 (Strojírny Prostějov v Odvolací finanční ředitelství), in which a similar preliminary question was raised by order of the Regional Court in Ostrava of 16 January 2013, no. 22 Af 159/2011-41. Subsequently, the Court of Justice ruled as follows:
Article 56 TFEU precludes legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which companies established in one Member State using workers employed and seconded by temporary employment agencies established in another Member State, but operating in the first Member State through a branch, are obliged to withhold tax and to pay to the first Member State an advance payment on the income tax due by those workers, whereas the same obligation is not imposed on companies established in the first Member State which use the services of temporary employment agencies established in that Member State.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 June 2014 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 24 July 2014, no. 1 Afs 38/2012-127) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Is the following health claim: 'The preparation also contains calcium and Vitamin D3, which help to reduce a risk factor in the development of osteoporosis and fractures', a reduction of disease risk claim within the meaning of Article 2(2)(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 116/2010 of 9 February 2010, even though it is not expressly implied in this claim that the consumption of that preparation would significantly reduce a risk factor in the development of disease mentioned?
2) Does the concept of a trade mark or brand name within the meaning of Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 116/2010 of 9 February 2010, also include a commercial communication on the packaging of the product?
3) Should the transitional provision in Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 116/2010 of 9 February 2010, be interpreted to refer to (any) foods which existed prior to 1 January 2005, or to refer to foods to which a trade mark or brand name was affixed and which existed in that form before that date?
The text of the reference for a preliminary ruling (order of 10 May 2012, no. 6 Ads 167/2011-82) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) Article 2(2)(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 116/2010 of 9 February 2010, must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to be considered a ‘reduction of disease risk claim’ within the meaning of that provision, a health claim need not necessarily expressly state that the consumption of a category of food, a food or one of its constituents ‘significantly’ reduces a risk factor in the development of a human disease.
2) Article 28(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006, as amended by Regulation No 116/2010, must be interpreted as meaning that a commercial communication appearing on the packaging of a food may constitute a trade mark or brand name, within the meaning of that provision, provided that it is protected, as a mark or as a name, by the applicable legislation. It is for the national court to ascertain, having regard to all the legal and factual considerations of the case before it, whether that communication is indeed a trade mark or brand name thus protected.
3) Article 28(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006, as amended by Regulation No 116/2010, must be interpreted as referring only to foods bearing a trade mark or brand name which must be considered a nutrition or health claim within the meaning of that regulation and which, in that form, existed before 1 January 2005.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 July 2013 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 17 October 2013, no. 6 Ads 167/2011-151) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Does Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community 2 (Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems) exclude from its scope ratione personae a citizen of the Czech Republic who, in circumstances such as those of the present case, before 1.1.1993 was subject to the legislation governing pensions insurance of a former State (the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics) and those periods, in accordance with Article 20 of the Agreement on social security concluded on 29.10.1992 between the Czech [Republic] and the Slovak Republic referred to in Annex III to Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council (Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council), are regarded as periods under the Slovak Republic and, under the national rules established by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, simultaneously also as periods under the Czech Republic?
If the answer to question (1) is in the negative:
2) Does Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in conjunction with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union and with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council (or Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council) prevent the authorities in the Czech Republic, in circumstances such as those of the present case, from offering preferential treatment (a supplement to old age benefit where the amount of that benefit granted under Article 20 of the Agreement on social security concluded on 29.10.1992 between the Czech [Republic] and the Slovak Republic and under Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council (Regulation No 883/2004) is lower than the benefit which would have been received if the retirement pension had been calculated according to the legislation of the Czech Republic) only to citizens of the Czech Republic, where the fundamental right to security in old age interpreted by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic specifically in relation to periods of pension benefit acquired in the former CSFR, and perceived as a part of the national identity, leads to that treatment, and where that treatment is not such as to interfere with the right of freedom of movement for workers as a basic right of the Union, in the situation where offering similar treatment to all other citizens of Member States of the EU who also acquired similar periods of pension benefit in the former CSFR would lead to a significant threat to the financial stability of the Czech Republic's system of pensions insurance?
If the answer to question (2) is in the affirmative:
3) Does European Union law prevent the national court, which is the highest court in the State in the field of administrative law and against whose decision there is no right of appeal, from being, in accordance with national law, bound by the legal assessment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic where that assessment seems not to be in accordance with Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 9 May 2012, no. 6 Ads 18/2012-82) can be found here.
The request for a preliminary ruling was withdrawn by order of 23 January 2012 (no. 6 Ads 18/2012-191), as the complainant withdrew the cassation complaint in its entirety. The order can be found here.
By order of 8 March 2019, the case was removed from the register of the Court of Justice. The order can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Does it follow from European Union law that a taxpayer has the right to be informed of a decision of the tax authorities to make a request for information in accordance with Directive 77/799/EEC? Does the taxpayer have the right to take part in formulating the request addressed to the requested Member State? If the taxpayer does not derive such rights from European Union law, is it possible for domestic law to confer similar rights on him?
2) Does a taxpayer have the right to take part in the examination of witnesses in the requested State in the course of dealing with a request for information under Directive 77/799/EEC? Is the requested Member State obliged to inform the taxpayer beforehand of when the witness will be examined, if it has been requested to do so by the requesting Member State?
3) Are the tax authorities in the requested Member State obliged, when providing information in accordance with Directive 77/799/EEC, to observe a certain minimum content of their answer, so that it is clear from what sources and by what method the requested tax authorities have obtained the information provided? May the taxpayer challenge the correctness of the information thus provided, for example on grounds of procedural defects of the proceedings in the requested State which preceded the provision of the information? Or does the principle of mutual trust and cooperation apply, according to which the information provided by the requested tax authorities may not be called in question?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 3 April 2012, no. 1 Afs 73/2011-90) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) European Union law, as it results in particular from Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation and taxation of insurance premiums, as amended by Council Directive 2006/98/EC of 20 November 2006, and the fundamental right to be heard, must be interpreted as not conferring on a taxpayer of a Member State either the right to be informed of a request for assistance from that Member State addressed to another Member State, in particular in order to verify the information provided by that taxpayer in his income tax return, or the right to take part in formulating the request addressed to the requested Member State, or the right to take part in examinations of witnesses organised by the requested Member State.
2) Directive 77/799, as amended by Directive 2006/98, does not govern the question of the circumstances in which the taxpayer may challenge the accuracy of the information conveyed by the requested Member State, and it does not impose any particular obligation with regard to the content of the information conveyed.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 October 2013 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 21 January 2014, no.1 Afs 73/2011-167) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) May non-organised, unsystematic and recreational sporting activities which can be carried on in that manner in an open-air swimming-pool complex (for instance, recreational swimming, recreational playing of ball games, etc.) be regarded as the exercise of sport or physical education within the meaning of Article 132(1)(m) of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax?
2) In the event of an affirmative answer to Question 1, is the supply for consideration of access to such an open-air swimming-pool complex, which offers its visitors the above-mentioned opportunity of exercising sporting activities, although alongside other kinds of amusement or recreation, to be regarded as a service closely linked to sport or physical education supplied to persons taking part in sporting or physical education activities within the meaning of that provision of Directive 2006/112/EC, and hence as a service exempted from value added tax in so far as it is supplied by a non-profit-making organisation and the other conditions under that directive are satisfied?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 15 December 2011, no. 5 Afs 1/2011-58) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) Article 132(1)(m) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that non-organised and unsystematic sporting activities which are not aimed at participation in sports competitions may be categorised as taking part in sport within the meaning of that provision.
2) Article 132(1)(m) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that access to an aquatic park offering visitors not only facilities for engaging in sporting activities but also other types of amusement or rest may constitute a supply of services closely linked to sport. It is for the referring court to determine whether, in the light of the interpretative guidance provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the present judgment and having regard to the specific circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, that is the position in that case.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 February 2013 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 31 May 2013, no. 5 Afs 1/2011-140) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Should Article 2(1), in conjunction with recital 9 of the preamble, of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals be interpreted to mean that this Directive does not apply to a third-country national who has applied for international protection within the meaning of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status?
2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must the detention of a foreign national for the purpose of return be terminated if he applies for international protection within the meaning of Directive 2005/85/EC and there are no other reasons to keep him in detention?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 22 September 2011, no. 1 As 90/2011-59) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, read in conjunction with recital 9 in the preamble, must be interpreted as meaning that that directive does not apply to a third-country national who has applied for international protection within the meaning of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status during the period from the making of the application to the adoption of the decision at first instance on that application or, as the case may be, until the outcome of any action brought against that decision is known.
2) Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers and Directive 2005/85 do not preclude a third-country national who has applied for international protection within the meaning of Directive 2005/85 after having been detained under Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 from being kept in detention on the basis of a provision of national law, where it appears, after an assessment on a case-by-case basis of all the relevant circumstances, that the application was made solely to delay or jeopardise the enforcement of the return decision and that it is objectively necessary to maintain detention to prevent the person concerned from permanently evading his return.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 May 2013 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 31 July 2013, no.1 As 90/2011-124) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) On a proper interpretation of Article 4a(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006, as inserted by Council Regulation (EC) No 1261/2007, does the commitment to cease delivery of a certain amount of quota beet to the undertaking with which he has concluded a delivery contract in the preceding marketing year mean a unilateral declaration of the grower that he will not deliver sugar beet in the marketing year 2008/2009, or does that commitment mean the written termination of the contractual relationship of the grower with the sugar company concerning deliveries of sugar beet for the said marketing year?
2) May the fact that a contractual party uses a step provided for by a directly binding EU legal provision result in the unenforceability of an obligation of that contractual party under a valid private law contract, on condition that, as a result of that fact, the other contractual party is granted funds from the public budget?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 8 July 2011, no. 2 As 49/2011-83) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) Article 4a(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 of 20 February 2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1261/2007 of 9 October 2007, must be interpreted as meaning that the undertaking to cease delivery of a certain quantity of sugar beet during the marketing year 2008/2009 may take the form of a unilateral declaration by the producer.
2) Article 4a(1) of Regulation No 320/2006, as amended by Regulation No 1261/2007, must be interpreted as meaning that the unilateral undertaking of the producer to cease delivery of a certain quantity of sugar beet during the marketing year 2008/2009 does not as such entail the inapplicability of its contractual obligations towards the sugar company.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 October 2012 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment 16 January 2013, no. 2 As 49/2011-170) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) May the concept of 'normal retirement age' at the time of transfer of a farm under Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural development from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain Regulations be interpreted as 'the age required for entitlement to a retirement pension' by a particular applicant under national legislation?
2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is it in accordance with European Union law and the general principles of European Union law for 'normal retirement age' at the time of transfer of a farm to be determined differently for individual applicants depending on their sex and the number of children they have brought up?
3) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what criteria should the national court take into account when interpreting the concept of 'normal retirement age' at the time of transfer of a farm under Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural development from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain Regulations?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 12 April 2011, no. 8 As 8/2010-94) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
It is incompatible with European Union law and the general principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination for ‘normal retirement age’, for the purposes of the second indent of Article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural development from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain regulations, to be determined differently depending on the gender of the applicant for support for early retirement from farming and, in the case of female applicants, on the number of children raised by the applicant, under the provisions of the national retirement scheme of the Member State concerned relating to the age required for entitlement to an old-age pension.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 April 2013 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 11 September 2013, no. 8 As 8/2010-233) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Does Article 306 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax refer only to supplies made by travel agents to end users of a travel service (travellers) or also to supplies made to other persons (customers)?
2) Should a transport company which merely provides transport of persons by providing bus transport to travel agencies (not directly to travellers) and which does not provide any other services (accommodation, information, consultancy etc.) be regarded as a travel agent for the purposes of Article 306 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 28 April 2011, no. 1 Afs 103/2010-68) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
A transport company which merely carries out the transport of persons by providing coach transport to travel agents and does not provide any other services such as accommodation, tour guiding or advice does not effect transactions falling within the special scheme for travel agents in Article 306 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 March 2012 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 11 July 2012, no. 1 Afs 103/2010-274) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Must point 6 in Part A of Annex III in connection with Article 7(2)(c) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, according to which the criterion for determining the successor state competent to take into account the insurance period completed by employed persons up to 31 December 1992 in the social security system of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is to remain applicable, be interpreted as precluding the application of a rule of national law according to which a Czech social security institution is to take into account fully, with regard to the entitlement to a benefit and the fixing of the amount thereof, the insurance period completed in the territory of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic up to 31 December 1992, even though, according to the above mentioned criterion, it is a social security institution of the Slovak Republic which is competent to take it into account?
2) If the first question is answered in the negative, must Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Community in conjunction with Articles 3(1), 10 and 46 of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community be interpreted as precluding that the insurance period completed in the social security system of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic up to 31 December 1992, which has already been taken into account once to the same extent for benefit purposes in the social security system of the Slovak Republic, be, pursuant to the above mentioned national rule, taken fully into account, with regard to the entitlement to old age benefit and the fixing of the amount thereof, only in respect of nationals of the Czech Republic resident in its territory?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 23 September 2009, no. 3 Ads 130/2008-107) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) The provisions of point 6 of Annex III(A) to Council Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 read in conjunction with Article 7(2)(c) thereof, do not preclude a national rule, which provides for payment of a supplement to old age benefit where the amount of that benefit, granted pursuant to Article 20 of the bilateral agreement between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic signed on 29 October 1992 as a measure to regulate matters after the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, is lower than that which would have been received if the retirement pension had been calculated in accordance with the legal rules of the Czech Republic.
2) The combined provisions of Article 3(1) and Article 10 of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended by Regulation No 629/2006, preclude a national rule, which allows payment of a supplement to old age benefit solely to Czech nationals residing in the territory of the Czech Republic, but it does not necessarily follow, under European Union law, that an individual who satisfies those two requirements should be deprived of such a payment.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 June 2011 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 25 August 2011, no. 3 Ads 130/2008-204) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Should Article 1(2) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the copyright protection of a computer program as a work under that directive, the phrase the expression in any form of a computer program' also includes the graphic user interface of the computer program or part thereof?
2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does television broadcasting, whereby the public is enabled to have sensory perception of the graphic user interface of a computer program or part thereof, albeit without the possibility of actively exercising control over that program, constitute making a work or part thereof available to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 16 September 2009, no. 5 As 38/2008-182) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) A graphic user interface is not a form of expression of a computer program within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs and cannot be protected by copyright as a computer program under that directive. Nevertheless, such an interface can be protected by copyright as a work by Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society if that interface is its author’s own intellectual creation.
2) Television broadcasting of a graphic user interface does not constitute communication to the public of a work protected by copyright within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 December 2010 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 2 February 2011, no. 5 As 38/2008-288) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
Must goods labelled as 'red dessert wine Kagor VK', contained in 0.75 litre bottles with an alcohol content of 15.8% - 16.1% by volume, to which beet sugar and corn alcohol have been added during their manufacture, those substances not originating from fresh grapes, be classified under heading 2204 or heading 2206 of the combined nomenclature of the customs tariff?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 2 September 2009, no. 7 Afs 11/2008-75) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1719/2005 of 27 October 2005, must be interpreted as meaning that a beverage fermented on the basis of fresh grapes, sold in 0.75 litre bottles, with an alcohol content of 15.8% to 16.1% by volume, to which beet sugar and corn alcohol have been added during the course of its production, must be classified under heading 2206 of the Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to that regulation.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 December 2010 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 24 January 2011, no. 7 Afs 11/2008-109) can be found here.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1) Must Article 2(i) and (k) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community, in conjunction with Article 1(e) and (f) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, and with point D10 of Annex IIA and point R1 of Annex IIB to that directive, be interpreted to the effect that the first of the criteria defined by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 13 February 2003 in Case C-458/00, Commission v Luxembourg, for it to be possible for the incineration of waste to be regarded as the recovery of waste to generate energy within the meaning of point R1 of Annex IIB to that directive (that is, the main purpose of the operation must be to enable waste to fulfil a useful function, namely the generation of energy) may also be satisfied in a case in which none of the circumstances is present which the Court of Justice mentioned in that judgment as factors testifying to recovery of waste, that is to say, where the operator of the installation in which waste is to be incinerated does not make a payment for the operation to the supplier of the waste and the installation is not technically adapted to be capable of operation on the basis of primary energy sources in the event of a shortage of waste?
2) If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, under what conditions may the operation be regarded in such a case as the recovery of waste?
(a) May the aspect of payment for the waste operation be disregarded altogether, or is it necessary at the very least, for it to be possible to regard the operation as the recovery of waste, that the income of the operator of the installation from the sale of the thermal or electrical energy obtained by the incineration of a certain quantity of waste exceeds the income of the operator of the installation from the payment for receiving the waste?
(b) As regards the nature of the installation of the recipient of waste, may it be regarded as a sufficient factor testifying to a waste recovery operation that in the decision authorising the operation of the installation it is formally classified as an installation for the recovery of waste for energy purposes and that the operator of the installation has contractually bound himself to feeding a certain quantity of thermal energy into the network and would face a contractual penalty if that obligation were breached, or is it a minimum condition for assessing the operation as the recovery of waste that the operator of the installation would from the legal, technical and economic point of view actually be capable of operating the installation, at least temporarily, on the basis of fuels other than waste?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 8 July 2009, no. 5 As 49/2009-138) can be found here.
The request for a preliminary ruling was withdrawn by order of 8 April 2010 (no. 5 As 49/2009-160), as the complainant withdrew the cassation complaint in its entirety. The order can be found here.
By order of 25 May 2010, the case was removed from the register of the Court of Justice. The order can be found here.
The need to submit the request for a preliminary ruling first arose in 2008, in a case involving the delivery and enforcement of customs and tax assessments issued by other Member States of the EU and the recovery of claims resulting from enforceable payment orders in customs and tax matters. The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following preliminary questions to the Court of Justice:
1) Must Article 12(3) of Council Directive of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures be interpreted as meaning that, where measures for enforcement of a claim are contested before the court of a Member State in which the requested authority has its seat, that court is entitled, in accordance with the legislation of that Member State, to review whether the instrument permitting enforcement (enforcement order) is enforceable and has been properly served on the debtor?
2) Does it follow from general legal principles of Community law, in particular from the principles of a right to a fair trial, sound administration and the rule of law, that service of the instrument permitting enforcement (enforcement order) on the debtor in a language other than one he understands, which, moreover, is not an official language of the State in which it is served on the debtor, constitutes a defect which makes it possible to refuse to enforce on the basis of such an instrument permitting enforcement (enforcement order)?
The text of the reference for the preliminary ruling (order of 5 May 2008, no. 5 Afs 48/2007-107) can be found here.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows:
1) Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, as amended by Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001, must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member States where the requested authority is situated do not, in principle, have jurisdiction to review the enforceability of an instrument permitting enforcement. Conversely, where a court of that Member State hears a claim against the validity or correctness of the enforcement measures, such as the notification of the instrument permitting enforcement, that court has the power to review whether those measures were correctly effected in accordance with the laws and regulations of that Member State.
2) In the framework of the mutual assistance introduced pursuant to Directive 76/308, as amended by Directive 2001/44, in order for the addressee of an instrument permitting enforcement to be placed in a position to enforce his rights, he must receive the notification of that instrument in an official language of the Member State in which the requested authority is situated. In order to ensure compliance with that right, it is for the national court to apply national law while taking care to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law.
The judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 January 2010 can be found here.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court Court (judgment of 25 February 2010, no. 5 Afs 48/2007-172) can be found here.